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A mathematical model describing the detection activities
of an integrated sensor array containing radars , visual
devices and remote sensors is presented. Using the pro-
grammed model, infiltration of a base defense area is simu-
lated with a computer and results are obtained for various
array deployment schemes. A comparative analysis of these
results is conducted using game and decision theory and a
general conclusion concerning an optimal sensor deployment
doctrine is derived. The complete computer program is
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I. SUMMARY
A requirement exists within the U.S. Army for analytic
techniques which provide quick answers to problems involving
equipment employment and tactical doctrine. Such a tech-
nique was used within this study to investigate the deploy-
ment doctrine for an integrated sensor system used in a
base defense role.
A series of assumptions concerning the relationships of
terrain, vegetation, enemy movement, and sensor detection
capabilities allowed the construction of several mathematical
models to describe a base defense problem within a particular
scenario. These models were used to develop a computer
program used for simulation of the problem. By changing
the specific placements of the sensors in accordance with
several different deployment doctrines, an indication of the
relative effectiveness of various doctrine was obtained.
The model made use of a simulated base camp located
within a selected ten by ten kilometer area. For sensor
resources, the base commander had available three ground
surveillance radars, four night observation devices, and
thirty unattended ground sensors where each system had
performance characteristics which represented composites of
systems within the U.S. Army inventory. These devices were
deployed to counter a 360° infiltration threat.

Game and decision theory were used in a comparative
cinalysis of the results obtained from the computer simula-
tion of eight deployment schemes against infiltration on
twelve preselected routes. It was concluded that doctrine
should not restrict the commander's options in placing the
radars and visual devices, however, the deployment of the
remote sensors should be limited by doctrine to the vicinity
of the base perimeter.
This study also pointed to the use of quick, simple
mathematical models used with computer simulation to provide
a capability for rapid analysis of small tactical situations,

II. INTRODUCTION
The experience of the U.S. Army during the conflict in
Vietnam has emphasized the relative ineffectiveness of the
intelligence and target acquisition resources available to
support the highly developed firepower and mobility systems
available to the field commander. Although refinement of
doctrine and equipment to improve the airmobile effective-
ness of U.S. forces has enabled the combat commander to
engage a targeted enemy force within a relatively short
time, successful identification and location of enemy forces
continues to be one of the major problems of the U.S. forces.
To help overcome this limitation the Army recently empha-
sized the development and employment of various surveillance,
target acquisition, and night observation (STANO) devices.
The emphasis in this area has led to the development of
numerous devices - some quite successful and some not
successful. Just to catalog the devices developed or being
developed requires a large reference document [1]
.
As the more successful systems have entered the Army's
inventory of equipment, it has become necessary to develop
standard methods of employing this equipment in various
combat situations. The U.S. Army Combat Developments Com-
mand (USACDC) has primary responsibility for the development
of tactical doctrine within the Army. Project MASTER
(Mobile Army Sensor/Target Acquisition Evaluation) at Fort

Hood, Texas, was chartered in the fall of 1969 with the
responsibility for conducting quick field tests of selected
sensor systems and extensive field tests of integrated
sensor systems.
A special problem recognized during the conflict in
Vietnam was that of defending the numerous bases spread
throughout the country. These bases are of many types, such
as logistical, artillery fire bases, and forward area land-
ing zones. Often, limited personnel at these bases preclude
extensive patrolling activities in defense of the base.
Normally a 360° infiltration threat exists with possible
rocket, mortar, or sapper (explosives) attack being the
major concerns. Doctrine for base defense, not only for
Vietnam but also in general, has been promulgated in Field
Manual 31-81 (TEST), March, 1970, [2]. The purpose of this
document is noted in paragraph 1-1 of the manual:
"This manual provides guidance to commanders, staff
officers, and other personnel concerned with the
defense of various types of semipermanent bases, such
as logistics installations, base camps, air fields,
and air bases , under varying conditions of security
that may exist in an area (theater) of operations."
The guidance mentioned is of a general nature, either
relying on the reader's knowledge of the proper employment of
detection devices or directing their attention to other
documents [3], [4], which, while providing information about
the relevant capabilities of different STANO systems, fail
to provide guidance for use of integrated systems.
In order to help alleviate this gap in doctrine, the
study described in this paper was initiated. The primary
8

purpose of the study was to develop a technique which would
allow the comparison of various doctrines for the employment
of sensing devices as part of an integrated sensor system.
Ideally, this technique should allow various doctrines to
be tested by deploying the sensor systems in a "realistic"
environment. The results obtained using various test doc-
trines could then be compared. The use of techniques
developed in this study permit the comparison of several
doctrines without resorting to a field test.
A secondary objective of the study was the comparison
of several doctrines for sensor deployment. The doctrines
were drawn from Army publications and from variations in
doctrine designed by the author.
In his speech to the U.S. Army Commander's Conference
on 2 December 1970, Lieutenant General John Norton,
Commanding General, U.S. Combat Developments Command, gave
as a major challenge facing U.S. Army testing efforts the
following:
"To design and operate some kind of simulated or
'Breadboard' Battlefield which will allow us to
'Plug-in' new hardware and ideas to typical combat
situations and to 'readout' useful results in a few
days or weeks.
"
The technique used in the study described by this paper
utilizes the simulated battlefield to compare various ideas
on integrated sensor employment.
The assumptions used in the construction of a base
defense model are outlined in Chapter III. The construction
of the model is described in Chapter IV. The computer

program written to incorporate the model is explained in
Chapter V and the program in its entirity is contained as an
appendix to this study.
The results obtained using computer simulation of the
base defense situation are contained in Chapter VI together
with a comparative analysis of the tested doctrines. Chapter
VII contains the conclusions and recommended extensions which
have resulted from this study.
10

III. RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS
In order to test various sensor deployment doctrines in
a fairly realistic environment, it was necessary to quantify
the variables which are found in such a situation. Such
factors as variations in terrain, in enemy tactics, and in
the operating characteristics of the sensing equipment had
to be simplified and represented symbolically in a mathe-
matical model. The techniques employed to simplify and
quantify the salient features of a situation can best be
classified as an art in which the success of the model
depends on the facility of the modeler and his knowledge of
the situation being represented. The assumptions used in
this study and the underlying rationale for their use are
explained in this chapter.
A. TERRAIN
In order to test various doctrines for employment of an
integrated sensor system with a model it is necessary to
carefully choose the terrain input. After a period of map
study which included examination of the terrain in four
areas - Southeast Asia; Fort Ord, California; Hunter Liggett
Military Reservation, California; and Fort Hood, Texas - the
area east of Hunter Liggett Military Reservation shown in
Figure 1 was selected as the most representative of the
terrains encountered during base defense. Some guidelines
were contrived for selection of terrain so that the site
11

Figure 1. The Ten by Ten Kilometer Area of Operations.




would be representative of common base locations and would
allow the comparison of various doctrines for employment of
ground surveillance radars and night observation devices in
an area where intervisibility (line-of-sight) characteris-
tics varied widely. The terrain selected satisfied the
guidelines almost perfectly. The guidelines were:
Selecting a point in the center of an area as a feasible
base location, the surrounding terrain should consist
of approximately 180° of mountainous, heavily vegetated
regions and 180° of flat, lightly vegetated terrain.
These characteristics should extend fairly continuously
for at least five kilometers in all directions. The
importance of terrain considerations will become clearer
upon examination of the doctrines used in the simulation.
The ten by ten kilometer area selected was divided into
10,000 one-hundred meter squares by imposing a two milimeter
grid onto the map. The average elevation of each of these
squares to the nearest ten feet was then computed by inter-
polation of the forty-foot-interval contour lines. These
elevations were recorded utilizing an X-Y coordinate system
as shown in Figure 2.
The elevation data was recorded on normal computer punch
cards - 16 readings to a card, for a total of 625 elevation
data cards.
The performance of any sensor is heavily dependent on
the type of vegetation present in the target area. For this
reason the vegetation characteristic of each of the 10,000
one-hundred meter squares was also recorded. A coding
system was used to identify the vegetation characteristic
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Figure 2. The Grid System.
1 - Open, little or no vegetation
2 - Lightly wooded, orchard
3 - Heavily wooded
4 - Water
These four classes of vegetation were the only ones
available from the map study. Because of the limited avail-
ability of vegetation data, no attempt was made to incor-
porate average foliage heights or other more descriptive
vegetation characteristics.
The vegetation characteristic of each square was recorded
on a data deck arranged identically to the elevation data
deck. The information was stored eighty squares to the card,




The three types of sensor systems used in this model are
composite representations of systems presently in use in the
Army, or systems which have been tested and approved for
procurement in the near future. Use was made of composite
systems for security reasons and to permit the use of the
model with future sensor systems as they are developed. The
model can be easily modified to accept sensor systems of
the same types as are presently represented but with
different performance characteristics. The three systems
utilized are listed below along with their pertinent per-
formance values.
Since the composition, mission, and resources available
vary widely among semipermanent bases, no basis of issue
exists for the three types of sensor systems utilized in
this problem. The procurement of detection devices as an
aid for base defense is based on the base commander's
need for such devices and the resources available to the
area commander [2]. For the purposes of this study, the
base commander is considered to have three operational radars
and four observation devices. These assigned resources are
based on sector coverage of each of these systems as
described below and allows the coverage of all or almost all
of 360" by each of the systems if employed symmetrically.
Ten strings of three sensors each are assumed available to




1. Ground Surveillance Radar
The ground surveillance radar utilized in the model
is characterized by the following performance values. The
radar has a minimum detection range of 400 meters and a
maximum effective detection range of 3200 meters. Targets
can be detected when they possess a radial velocity between
one and sixty kilometers per hour inclusive. The radar
utilizes a continuous sector scan of 110° width. Sequential
automatic range gating is used by the radar in sectors of
400 meters depth requiring one minute per sector. The
radar possesses a moderate foliage penetration capability
with sixty percent of optimum effectiveness in lightly
wooded (Type 2) terrain, and twenty percent of optimum
effectiveness in heavily wooded (Type 3) terrain. An impor-
tant aid to the line-of-sight capability of the radar is the
locatim of the antenna on a mast twenty meters high. The
nominal probability of detection of personnel within the
effective range is assumed to be 0.90 under optimum
conditions.
2. Night Observation Device
The night observation device utilized in the model
has a maximum effective range of 1600 meters assuming at
most light cloud cover, with the moon between one and three
quarters. Each device has a field of view of 9** and is
assigned (within the model) a sector of 90° to be covered in
9° increments. The detection ability of an observer using
this device is degraded only moderately because of vegetation.
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Device effectiveness is considered to be eighty percent of
optimum against targets in a lightly wooded (Type 2) area
and forty percent of optimum in a heavily wooded (Type 3)
area. The optimum probability of detection for the night
observation device is considered to be range dependent,
where
Probability of Detection =
0.90, for ranges less than
400 meters
0.90 (400/range) , for ranges
greater than 400 meters.
In contrast to the doppler-operating ground surveil-
lance radar, the night observation device depends primarily
on the human eye as the actual detecting device. It would
appear reasonable that personnel will be extremely cautious
when searching the area immediately in front of their obser-
vation post. Therefore, the detection probability is assumed
to have its maximum value of 0.90 until the range is
sufficient (400 meters) for reducing self-preservation
induced caution. Thereafter, the probability of detection
is assumed to be roughly inversely proportional to the range
of the target. These assumptions appear tenable and are not
inconsistent when contrasted with the varying formulas used
to determine detection probabilities in the literature [5]
,
[7].
3. Unattended Ground Sensors
The unattended ground sensor utilized in the model
is of the Seismic/Acoustic type with a radius of detection
of 40 meters. The sensors are deployed in groups of three
(called strings) with individual sensors located
17

approximately 200 meters apart in accordance with current
Army doctrine [3]. The reliability of the individual
sensors, often a problem in actual deployment, was not con-
sidered in the model. The probability of detection of a
target within the sensor radius of detection is considered
to be 0.90.
Considering thirty sensors with a radius of detec-
tion of 40 meters and a detection probability of .90 it
would appear that the probability of detecting an intruder
with random (non-overlapping) deployment of sensors would
be calculated as follows:
probability / n^!"^?^




Detection I Sensors I Covered by 1/ 1 Area to be
. . Vprobabilityy ^Deployed yVone Sensor/r \Protectedy
PD - (-90) (30) (40)^ TT
(5000)^ 7T
PD = 0.00173.
This rather low value is the instantaneous prob-
ability of detecting the intruder. To arrive at a more
meaningful figure, the intruder's movement and the time he
spends in the base defense area must be considered. The
method used to move the intruder groups will be explained
in detail below. It is sufficient for the sake of calcula-
ting the detection probability of the thirty remore sensors
to know that the intruder groups are moved discretely from
one 100-meter square to the next. At each move a check for
detection is made. Each unattended ground sensor is placed
within a specific 100-meter square. If the intruder enters
18

the square, then the probability of detection is calculated
by:
(Sensor \ / The Area \ //The Area^
Detection j( Covered by ]/[ of the
Probability/ Ithe Sensor // I Square
PD = (0»90) (40)^ TT
(100)^
and PD = 0.4526.
Considering that there are 30 sensors available for deploy-






squares within the five kilometer radius base defense area,
and that each intruder group makes an average of 4 6.5
discrete grid square moves, then the probability that an
intruder is detected by a randomly placed sensor is;
(Number of \ /Probability that the\ /Probability Intruder
Moves Made j[ Intruder Moves to a )( is Detected by a Sensor
by Intruder/l Square with a Sensor /l Located in the Square
PD= (46.5) (ylfy) (0.4526),
PD =0.08.
This is a somewhat more realistic estimate of the
chance of detecting an intruder with randomly placed sensors
When it is considered that the intruder will not move ran-
domly, but will be constrained by the terrain and his
objective, and that the unattended ground sensors will be
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placed in the most likely infiltration areas as determined
by a map reconnaissance and the specified doctrine, then the
chance for detection of the intruder utilizing thirty
sensors appears reasonable.
C. INTRUDER MOVEMENTS
In order to test the various sensor system deployment
doctrines it was necessary to generate some type of
penetration through the base defense area. Randomized
intruder routes were considered. Randomizing the routes
would require selection of entry points at random from among
0° to 360*'. Intruders would then be moved toward the base
in a random manner under the constraints of target and
terrain. This method was rejected for two major reasons.
In order that the deployment doctrines be compared it
appeared that the intrusion against systems deployed in
accordance with each specific doctrine should be constant.
Random movement of intruders appears to be an unrealistic
action on the part of the enemy.
Instead, it was decided that twelve different penetra-
tion efforts would be simulated against each deployed system.
It appeared that three infiltrators per quadrant would
provide an adequate test of the systems used to protect this
area. These intruders enter the base defense area from
twelve points distributed uniformly around the 360" defense
perimeter, with their individual routes within the defense
area remaining constant throughout the simulation runs. To
provide realism in developing the scenario, an experienced
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Infantry Officer trained in patrolling tactics assisted in
selecting the infiltration routes. The officer was supplied
with a map of the area with twelve indicated starting points,
each located six kilometers from the known objective. He
was requested to mark intrusion routes in accordance with
the following guidelines:
1. Intruders will travel in groups of 2-5 men.
2. Travel will be entirely at night.
3. Speed is important to the intruders, but should be
balanced with a desire to avoid detection.
4. The intruders have a general knowledge of U.S.
detection efforts, but not specific knowledge of techniques.
5. Each group should be considered as a separate entity.
There is no interaction between groups.
6. Effort should be made to keep the infiltration route
within 90° of direct approach unless the terrain prohibits
this approach.
7. All indicated man-made structures on the map should
be ignored with the exception of roads, bridges, and rail-
road tracks.
The intrusion routes selected are shown in Figure 3.
These routes were digitized using the previously explained
X-Y grid system and are an input to the program.
As previously explained, the movements of an intruder
group are simulated in the model by discrete moves from one
100 meter square to the next along their programmed route.
A check for detection is made after each move. Although
21

Shaded areas indicate broken terrain
Figure 3. The Preselected Infiltration Routes
22

there is no continuous chance for detection throughout the
route of the intruder, movement tine, direction and velocity-
are computed based on the gradient of the terrain and the
vegetation. These values influence the probabilities of
detection of the ground surveillance radars and the night
observation devices. This method of checking for detections
after discrete movements and modification of detection
probabilities based on the parameters of the move appears
tenable for the purpose of the study. No better method
suggested itself during study of models constructed to
handle similar problems.
D. ENVIRONMENT
The environment assumed for the model has a major impact
on the results obtained in a study such as this. For the
purposes of this study the environmental conditions are
assumed to be:
1. Night with light or no cloud cover, one to three
quarters moon and no fog or haze.
2. No percipitation. Rain is quite detrimental to both
visual and radar systems.
3. Light to no wind. Wind caused vegetation movements
degrades the efficiency of the doppler radar systems.
E. SENSOR PLACEMENT
In order to obtain unbiased placements of the sensor
systems in accordance with each of the specified doctrines
the aid of another U.S. Army officer was requested. It was
23

desired that this officer have a general knowledge of base
defense problems, a realization of the line-of-sight con-
straints imposed by dominating terrain and no knowledge of
pre-selected intruder routes. A contemporary, an experienced
Field Artillery officer and student at the Naval Postgraduate
School, was selected to place the systems. He was supplied
with a map of the area of operations which contained indi-
cations of the base location and the five kilometer radius
base defense area. He was also supplied with eight blank
overlays and a statement of instructions which outlined the
general base defense problem, the sensor systems available
for employment, and the eight test doctrines of sensor
deployment (Appendix A) . System performance values were
supplied along with specific constraints on sensor locations.
The officer was requested to locate the sensor systems in
accordance with each of the doctrines and the requirements
for base defense. The placement of the systems was noted
on a separate overlay for each doctrine.
The locations of each of the devices was then digitized
using the X-Y grid system and became an input to the
applicable simulation run.
F. DETECTION CRITERIA
In order to inject additional realism into the model, a
decision rule was developed for declaration of a detection.
This rule as incorporated in the model is that two indicated
detections of any intruder group within a base-to-target
24

range of 500 meters by any combination of individual devices
constitute a formal detection. For example, if Ground
Surveillance Radar Number 1 detects Intruder Group 1 at a
range from the base of 1850 meters and later a detection of
Intruder Group 1 is indicated from Sensor String Number 7
at a range of 1375 meters, then a formal detection is
declared, the movement of the intruder group is terminated,
the applicable facts are noted, and the next intruder group
begins its advance.
This decision rule was included in the model to provide
for such existing system problems as:
1. The high false alarm rate of unattended ground
sensors
.
2. The clutter problem often associated with vegetation
movements which exists with doppler operating ground sur-
veillance radars.
3. The strain-caused hallucinary effects often noted
with devices requiring the human eye for night detection.
The actual decision rule that should be used to consider
the above problems in a model such as this is a matter of
some discussion. It appears, however, that the two detec-
tion, 500 meter rule provides the realism required for the
purposes of this study. The proper decision rule to use is
a portion of the command and control procedures associated
with an integrated sensor system such as that described in
this study. Because the question of optimal command and
control procedures is a complex one, it is felt that the
25

resolution of this problem should be the focus of a study
devoted entirely to this subject.
In the next chapter, the methods used to construct the
model using the assumptions and rationale described will be
discussed. The necessity for thorough consideration of




Having acquired a simplification of reality by the
assumptions described in Chapter III, one may now describe
the scenario in which the doctrines will be tested by con-
structing a model of the base defense problem. This model,
composed of several submodels, describes by use of math-
ematical relationships the actions and reactions occurring
within the base defense area and ultimately produces
resultant answers to the questions: Has an intruder been
detected? If a detection has been made, what was the range
at which the intruder was detected and which devices were
responsible for this detection? The following paragraphs
describe the construction of the model used in this study.
A. SCENARIO
The study used a specific base defense problem as a
reference from which the various alternative doctrines could
be evaluated. The selection of the actual physical site
for the problem was described earlier in the discussion of
terrain selection. As a part of the base defense, the
sensing devices of an integrated sensor system are deployed
around the base in order to detect intrusion of the base
defense area by the enemy. The devices are employed in
accordance with each specific doctrine.
The threat of enemy infiltration exists randomly through-
out the base defense area with possible infiltration routes
27

limited only by natural terrain barriers. This means that
the particular deployment of the sensor systems must be
directed against an enemy intrusion from any direction
tempered only by knowledge of existing terrain barriers.
In the simulation, twelve enemy intruder groups are moved
towards the base camp one at a time, over preselected
infiltraticn routes . The different doctrines are compared
in terms of the success realized by the particular deploy-
ment of the sensors against all infiltrating groups.
B. DETECTIONS
The success or failure of a particular detection device
in a given situation is a matter of the capabilities of the;
system tempered by chance. To model the results of a sensor
operating against various threats requires that a variety
of factors be considered and accounted for in the model.
The sensor systems considered in this study are of two
general types. The ground surveillance radar
and the night observation device are line sensors, while
the unattended ground sensor could be characterized as a
point sensor.
To model a line sensor requires consideration of the
direction in which the sensor is aimed, the maximum effec-
tive range of the device, the line-of-sight requirement,
sensitivity to the target area environment, sensitivity to
target speed, and reduction in the detecting capability of
the device as the range to the target increases. Also of
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considerable importance is t±ie basic probability of detec-
tion when using the device; that is, how many times out of
a certain number of chances will a given target be detected
with the device? All of these factors, when applicable,
have been considered in modeling the ground surveillance
radars and the night observation devices in this study.
As was stated in Chapter III, the basic probability of
detection utilizing the ground surveillance radar is con-
sidered to be 0.90. This means that nine detections out of
ten chances could be expected when utilizing this device in
optimum conditions. The model constructed for the radars
establishes this basic probability and then proceeds to
reduce it in accordance with the vegetation in the target
area and the time the target is available in the search area
of the radar. In the simulation, Monte Carlo methods are
used to determine if a detection has occurred. Of course,
before the target can be considered for detection, it must
be within the search area, within the maximum range, and
within the line-of-sight of the radar. The target must, in
addition, exceed the minimum radial velocity threshold of
the radar.
Modeling of the night observation device in the study
is in many respects identical to the radar problem. In fact,
it will be seen in Chapter V that these devices share many
portions of the programmed model. Besides the differences
in maximum effective ranges and sector coverage noted in
Chapter III, the visual devices differ in detection
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capability from the radars in the required reduction in
probability of detection as the range to the target exceeds
400 meters and the lack of requirement for minimum radial
speeds of the target.
A point type sensor does not require the complexity of
modeling that the line types do, but still, representing
realistic detection activity presented a problem. The major
effort in modelirg the detections of the unattended ground
sensors lay in the necessity of representing a small (40
meter radius) area of detecting region within a problem
which utilized a fairly large (100 meter) increment of area
measurement. This was accomplished by confining the sensor
area of influence to the grid square in which it was located
and utilizing the detection probability computed in
Chapter III.
Randomization of actual detections with the night
observation devices and the unattended ground sensors is
accomplished in a manner identical with the radar model.
C. INTERVISIBILITY
The most tedious portion of the model concerns the
continuous line-of-sight determinations for the line sensors
Without the aid of a computer this facet of the model would
negate the ability to simulate a realistic situation since
manual intervisibility checks are both time-consuming and
tedious. Intervisibility determination was reduced to a
computer compatable algorithm. After it has been
30

established that the target is within the search sector and
within range of the sensor, this coded algorithm is used to
determine if the target is within line-of-sight of a par-
ticular line sensor. The algorithm utilizes basic trigo-
nometry and the elevation characteristics of the base defense
area to determine if the intruder group being considered is
within the line-of-sight of a particular device. The
vertical angle between the device and the target location
is computed and then the algorithm checks intermediate
elevations by a series of incremented steps to determine if
the basic vertical angle is exceeded. If no intermediate
vertical angle exceeds the basic angle, the target is con-
sidered to be within the line-of-sight of the device.
Results of the intervisibility check determine whether
the detection models of the line sensors will be utilized.
D. MOVEMENT
The movement of the intruder groups within the area is
accomplished by discretely relocating the group from one
grid square to the next in accordance with the preselected
infiltraticn routes . The groups are considered in the
problem sequentially - one through twelve - with each
group's movement simulated from entry to completion (detec-
tion or successful infiltration) prior to consideration of
the next group. Therefore, at no time will more than one




The movement of the intruder groups described above
involves constant bookkeeping so that the location of the
intruder group being considered is always known. The
detection models of the line sensors, however, require
information about actual movements of the intruder groups;
that is, the distance covered, the average speed, and the
time required in moving from the previous grid square to
the grid square in which the group is located. In order to
furnish this information, a movement model has been
constructed.
The movement model enables the computation of the
distance traveled by the group during the move by determin-
ing if the group moved to a contiguous square (a distance
of 100 meters) or to a diagonally contiguous square (a dis-
tance of 141.1 meters). Using night travel speed for open
terrain from military sources [5] and reducing this speed
in accordance with the slope and vegetation characteristics
of the particular terrain being traversed, an average speed
of movement and the time required for the move are computed.
Finally, the radial velocity of the intruder group with
respect to the particular device being considered is com-
puted from the change in target-to-device range and the time
of movement.
E. INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE MODELS
The models discussed in this chapter describe the move-
ments of the intruder groups within the base defense area
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and the detection determinations which take place after each
of an intruder group's discrete moves. A general outline
of the models' use during each move would appear helpful in
understanding how the situation has been simulated.
The location of the intruder group being considered is
changed to the next location in accordance with the pre-
selected infiltration routes. A check is made to determine
if the group is within the scan sector and maximum range of
a line sensor. If the group is located within the detection
region of a line sensor, an intervisibility check is made
to determine line-of-sight from the device to the group's
location. If the group is within line-of-sight of the line
sensor, the appropriate (radar or visual) detection model
is used to determine whether a detection has been made.
The movement model is used to furnish required information
to the line sensor detection model. If a detection is made,
a check of the two detection, five-hundred meter rule is
required to determine if a formal detection has been made.
Upon completing the use of the line sensor models, the
point sensor (unattended ground sensor) model is used to
determine if the group has been detected by this type sensor,
Again, the decision rule is used for determination of a
formal detection.
Examination of various deployment doctrine alternatives
using computer simulation was necessary because of the many
intervisibility and detection checks necessary to adequately
test each doctrine in the environment and against the
33

infiltration threat prescribed. The following chapter
describes in detail the computer program which was written
utilizing the ideas described in this chapter.
34

V. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROGRAM
This chapter contains the description of the computer
simulation program based on the base defense model. The
program was written in G-level Fortran IV and incorporates
several built-in functions available in the standard IBM
scientific programming package. A copy of the program is
appended to this study.
The general logic of the program is shown in Figure 4.
This diagram shows the relationships among the major com-
ponents of the program. Each of these major components will
be described in detail in the sections that follow.
The program as it presently exists requires 109,668
bytes of storage space during the execution phase and
required twenty seconds to compile and approximately seventy-
three seconds for each twenty-five iteration run utilizing
the IBM 360/67 system at the Naval Postgraduate School.
A. THE MAIN PROGRAM
The very simple logic of the main program is shown in
Figure 5. This portion of the program serves as the overall
control of the simulation. During the initial execution all
data enters the assigned storage. This data consists of the
following:
1, Elevation Data
Stored in array ELEV, a 100 by 100 element matrix, the









4. Move Intruder Groups 1
- 12 sequentially.
i 9.
5. Call the intervisibility
routine. If target is in
scan, in range, and in
line-of-sight of a radar
Go To 6. If target is in
scan, in range, and in
line-of-sight of a visual
device Go To 7. If 10.
neither, or when com-
pleted Go To 8.
i
6. Radar detection routine.
Call movement routine for
movement parameters. Com- 11.
pute detection probabil-
ity. Draw a random num-
ber. If a detection is
made call detection rou- 12.
tine. If no detection or
when completed return
to 5. 13.
7. Visual detection routine.
Call movement routine for 14.
movement parameters. Com-
pute detection probabil-
ity. Draw a random number.
If a detection is made,
call detection routine.
If no detection or when
completed return to 5.
I
8. If a detection has been
signaled by the detec-
tion routine Go To next
intruder and return to
4. If not. Go To 9.
<^
<?
Call the sensor detection
routine. If intruder is in
range of an UGS , check for
detection. If detected call
detection routine. If no
detection or when comple-
ted, Go To 10.
If a detection has been
signaled by the detection
routine go to next intru-
der and return to 4 . If
not. Go To 11.
;
If last move of intruder.
Go To 12. Otherwise, return
to 4.
1
If last intruder. Go to 13.
Otherwise, Go To 4.
If last iteration. Go To
4. Otherwise, Go To 3.
1
STOP





2. Store Elevation Data.
I
3. Store Vegetation Data.
1
4. Store Intruder Route
Data.
j
5. Store Observation Device
Location.
1
6. Store Observation Device
Center Scan Orientations.
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7. Store UGS Locations.
I
8. Move Intruder Group
(1-12) to the next 100
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formal detection. Go
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. , where XXXX is a four digit number representing
the average elevation to the nearest ten feet of the partic-
ular 100 meter square. Information is retrieved from this
array utilizing a statement such as BASEL = ELEV (Y,X) , where
Y and X represent the coordinates of the desired 100 meter
square reading up to Y then right to X.
2. Vegetation Data
Information about the prevalent vegetation charac-
teristics of each 100 meter square is stored in array ZVEG,
also a 100 by 100 matrix. The vegetation data consists of
10,000 coded vegetation characteristics in accordance with
the format described in Chapter II and of the form X, where
X is an integer between one and four inclusive. Vegetation
information concerning a particular 100 meter square can be
obtained with a statement such as ZZ = ZVEG (Y,X) , where Y
and X are obtained as above.
3. Intruder Route Data
The data stored in arrays INTl through INT12 is a
digital representation of the route each of the intruder
groups followed from the group's entry point to the base
camp. Each of these arrays is an N by 2 matrix where N
represents the total number of 100 meter squares traversed
by the intruder group throughout the infiltration route.
Coordinates for a particular location of an intruder group




Desiring the coordinates of the 26 square traversed
by the sixth intruder, retrieve X and Y coordinates with
these statements;
X = INT6 (26,1) ,
Y = INT6 (26,2) .
4. Number of Squares Traversed
The number of squares traversed by each intruder
group - the N referred to above in paragraph 3 - is stored
in array NNN(12), a vector of twelve elements. This infor-
mation is required to control the cycling of the computer
program.
5. Coordinates of the Observation Devices
The locations of the ground surveillance radars and
the night observation devices during a specific simulation
are stored in arrays OBSX and OBSY. These are seven-element
vectors with the information ordered such that Elements
One through Three correspond to radars one through three
and Elements Four through Seven correspond to visual devices
one through four. To obtain the location of the second
night observation device for example, the following state-
ments are used:
X = OBSX (5), Y = OBSY (5).
6. Scan Orientation
The orientation of each observation device is
established by storing the center scan orientation of the
devices in array SCAN, a seven element vector. The orien-
tation of the radars and the visual devices are ordered in
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the same manner as in the OBSX and OBSY arrays above. The
values in the SCAN array represent the center scan of each
device to the nearest tenth degree reading counterclockwise
from east. For example, 90.0 represents a northern orien-
tation and 180.0 a western orientation.
7. Unattended Ground Sensor Locations
The locations of the unattended ground sensors
during a specific simulation are stored in arrays OSTl
through OSTIO. The location of the three remote sensors of
each sensor string may be obtained from these arrays in the
following manner:
Desiring the location of the first sensor in sensor
string number 1 , retrieve the X and Y coordinates of this
sensor with these statements;
X = 0ST7 (1,1) ,
Y = 0ST7 (1,2) .
In addition to inputing the data for the particular
simulation, the main program controls the movement of the
intruder groups during the program run. Normally the
intruder groups are moved sequentially through their routes
and checks are made for detection by ground surveillance
radars , night observation devices , and unattended ground
sensors after each individual movement. However, if an
indication is received from the detection subroutine of a
formal detection, the intruder group being moved by the
main program is terminated and the next group's movement is
started. Intrusions by the twelve intruder groups are
replicated twenty-five times before program termination.
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Since the major purpose of this study was to demon-
strate a technique for comparing doctrines, twenty-five
replications of the simulated problem appeared to be adequate.
While requiring less than two minutes per simulation run,
twenty-five replications nonetheless provide results which
can be used to demonstrate a method of analysis.
B. THE INTERVISIBILITY SUBROUTINE
An outline of the intervisibility subroutine named INVIS
is shown in Figure 6. This routine is used to decide if an
intruder group has moved into an area that is within the
scan, within the maximum range, and within line-of-sight of
a ground surveillance radar or a night observation device.
If all these conditions are met, then the radar detection
subroutine or the visual detection subroutine are called.
The first action occurring within the intervisibility
model is a determination of an intruder's presence within
the scan sector of any of the observation devices. To
accomplish this, the angle from each device to the intruder's
location is computed and then, for each device, a check is
made to see if the angle value falls within the following
upper and lower limits:
SCANPLUS = Center scan orientation of the device
plus one half the scan sector,
SCANMINUS = Center scan orientation of the device
minus one half the scan sector,
where the scan sector is equal to 110° for the ground sur-






INVIS called from Main
Program.
M.
Check GSR 1-3 and NOD1-4 sectors to see if




If not in sector, Go To
4. If intruder is in
sector. Go To 5.
If this is last device,
return to Main Program.
Otherwise, designate
next device and Go To
2.
1
5. Compute range from
target to observation
device. If not in range
of device. Go To 4.
Otherwise, Go To 6.
6
6. Compute vertical angle
and check for line-of-
sight. If target is not
visible from device. Go
To 4. Otherwise, Go To 7
7.
i
If device is a radar. Go
to 8. Otherwise, Go To 9
i
Call Radar Detection
Routine. Upon return of
control Go To 4.
i
Call Visual Detection
Routine. Upon return of
control Go To 4
.
Figure 6. The Intervisibility Subroutine (INVIS).
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Fairly detailed logic is necessary to insure proper coverage
of the case where a sector includes 0°.
A small subroutine called COORD is used during this
process to convert radian answers to degrees and to insure
proper quadrant location
If after movement, an intruder group is within the
assigned sector of a ground surveillance radar or a night
observation device, the intervisibility routine computes the
range from the target to the observing device. If the group
is within the 3200 meters of a radar or 1600 meters of a
visual device, the model begins the line-of-sight determin-
ation.
The logic used for the line-of-sight determination may
be explained by an example. Consider that the observation
device is located in the center of a circle and the intruder
is located on the circumference as shown in Figure 7. The
method used to check for intervisibility is as follows:
1. From the angle previously computed determine which
stepping case to use. If the angle lies between 315° and
45" (315° < e<45°), use Case 1; if 45° < 6 <135°, use Case
2; if 135 < e < 225° , use Case 3; if 225° < 6 < 315° , use
Case 4. The stepping case used dictates the direction and
grid component (X or Y) used to step from the observation
device to the target location while checking for line-of-
sight.
2. Retrieve the elevation of the observing device and
the target based on their locations by using the inputed
elevation data. Compute the vertical angle from the
observing device to the target location.
3. Now begin a series of steps from the observation





Figure 7, The Intervisibility Diagram.
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Positive X direction for Case 1
Positive Y direction for Case 2
Negative X direction for Case 3
Negative Y direction for Case 4.
Compute the location of the nearest 100 meter square using
the sum of the steps and the angle. Check the vertical angle
from the observation device to this square. If while
stepping towards the target any vertical angle is greater
than the basic vertical angle, the target is not visible
from the device and control is transferred back to the early
portion of the program for scan checks of the remaining
devices
.
4. If no intermediate vertical angle is greater during
the stepping process, the target is in the line-of-sight of
the device and control is transferred to the radar detection
subroutine or the visual detection subroutine as appropriate.
C. THE RADAR DETECTION SUBROUTINE
The basic logic used in the radar detection subroutine
(RATECT) is shown in Figure 8. Here, it is first determined
whether the target has penetrated beyond the minimum range
of the ground surveillance radars (400 meters) . If it has
not, a basic detection probability of .90 is established.
The movement subroutine (MOVE) is then called. From it is
received required information on the target's radial velo-
city (rate of speed directly towards a point) with respect
to the radar and the time the target is available for
detection (see paragraph E, below for a description of the
movement subroutine). If the target's radial velocity with
respect to the radar is less than one kilometer per hour,
then in accordance with the assumed limitations of the radar
no detection is possible. However, if the radial velocity
of the target is within detection limits, data about the
vegetation characteristics of the target area will be
retrieved from computer storage and the radar detection
45

1. Called from the inter-
visibility subroutine.
A target is available
to a specified GSR.
Go To 2.1
2. If the target is closer
than 400 meters return
to INVIS. Otherwise Go
To 3. I
3. Set Radar Detection pro-
bability to 0.90. Go To 4
i
Call the Movement Sub-
routine for target's
radial velocity and




5. If radial velocity is
less than 1 Km/Hr,
return control to INVIS.
Otherwise Go To 6.
1
6. Determine vegetation in









Probability for time the
target is available. Go
to 8.
1




If the random number is
less than the adjusted
Radar Detection Prob-
ability, Go To 10. Other-
wise Go To 11.
i
Call the Detection Sub-
routine. Upon return of
control. Go To 11.
I
Return control to the
Intervisibility Sub-
routine .




probability will be adjusted in consonance with the assumed
foliage penetration characteristics of the radar.
Since it is assumed that one minute is required to
search each 400 meters to 3200 meters, it takes the radar
seven minutes to cover its entire area of responsibility.
Therefore, if the target availability time received from
the movement subroutine is less than seven minutes, the
radar probability of detection is proportionally reduced
if the target availability time is less than seven minutes.
The actual radar detection probability for any given target
availability is computed as follows:
Radar Detection Probability = (.90) (Vegetation Factor)
[Min (Target Availability Time, 7) /7]
1.0 for Code 1 (Open terrain)
0.6 for Code 2 (Lightly wooded)
0.2 for Code 3 (Heavily wooded)
.0.5 for Code 4 (Water)
where the Vegetation Factor =
Finally, a random number is drawn and compared to the
adjusted radar probability of detection. If a simulated
detection occurs, this fact is passed to the detection
subroutine.
D. THE VISUAL DETECTION SUBROUTINE
The basic logic used in the visual detection subroutine
(VITECT) is depicted in Figure 9. This routine is used to
control the detections made by night observation devices
after it has been determined by the intervisibility sub-
routine that a target is located within the maximum range.
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1-. Called from the Inter-
visibility Subroutine.
A target is available to
a specified NOD. Go To 2.
2. Set NOD detection Prob-
ability to 0.90. Go To 3.
i
3. If the target is closer
than 400 meters, Go To 4.
Otherwise adjust NOD detec
tion probability for range
and Go To 4.
1
4. Call the Movement Sub-
routine for target's
time available. Go To 5.
i
5. If target time available
is 5 minutes or greater.
Go To 6. Otherwise adjust
NOD detection probability




6. Determine vegetation in
target area and adjust NOD
detection probability if
required. Go To 7.
7. Draw a random number. Go
To 8. I
8. If the random number is
less than the adjusted NOD
detection probability. Go
To 9. Otherwise Go To 10.
i
9. Call the Detection Sub-
routine. Upon return of
control. Go To 10.
10. Return control to the
Intervisibility Sub-
routine.
Figure 9. The Visual Detection Subroutine (VITECT)
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the assigned sector of responsibility, and the line-of-sight
of a specific visual device.
A basic visual detection probability is initially estab-
lished within this model. If the target-to-observer range
is in excess of 400 meters, the visual detection probability
is reduced in accordance with the assumptions by multiplying
it by the ratio: 400 to target-to-observer range.
Since the visual device has a field of view of only 9°
,
it is assumed that a full sweep of the 90° area of respon-
sibility requires some five minutes. The movement routine
is called to obtain the target availability time and if
this availability time is less than five minutes, the visual
probability of detection is reduced by multiplying it by
target availability time divided by five.
The vegetation characteristics of the target area are
retrieved from storage and the detection probability is
adjusted in consonance with the assumed foliage penetration
capability of the visual device. The actual detection
probability for any given available target is computed as
follows
:
Visual Detection Probability = (0.90) [400/Max (Range,
400) J [Min (Target Availability Time,5)/5] (Vegetation
Factor)
,
1.0 for Code 1 (Open Terrain)
where the Vegetation Factor = 0.8 for Code 2 (Lightly Wooded)
0.4 for Code 3 (Heavily Wooded)
0.5 for Code 4 (Water)
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Finally, a random number is drawn and compared to the
adjusted visual probability of detection. If a simulated
detection occurs, this fact is passed to the detection
subroutine.
E. THE MOVEMENT SUBROUTINE
The basic logic used in the movement subroutine (MOVE)
is shown in Figure 10. This subroutine computes information
relative to the movement of the intruder group which is used
by the radar and visual detection routines.
Using the intruder's present location (from the calling
program) and his previous location (from stored route data)
,
the model computes the distance traveled by the intruder
during this move. Because of the discrete nature of intru-
der movements within the model, the distance traveled must
be either 100 meters (movement to a directly contiguous
square) or 141.4 meters (movement to a diagonally contiguous
square) . Using the elevations of the present and previous
intruder locations, the average absolute slope traversed by
the intruder group is calculated. The base velocity of
three kilometers per hour assumed for all intruder groups is
then adjusted in the following manner:
slope <. .05, Base velocity unchanged
.05 < slope ^ .20, Base velocity reduced by 10%
.20 < slope £ .40, Base velocity reduced by 30%
,40 < slope , Base Velocity reduced by 50%.
The vegetation characteristic of the target area is




1. Called from Radar Detec-
tion or Visual Detection
Subroutine. Go To 2.
2. Retrieve intruder's pre-
vious location. Go To 3.
i




4. Set Base Velocity equal
to 3 Km/Hr. Go To 5.
5. Calculate gradient of
move. Adjust velocity
for gradient. Go To 6.
6
9
6. Retrieve vegetation charac-
teristics. Adjust velocity
for vegetation. Go To 7.
i
7. Compute time required for
this move. Go To 8.
I
8. Calculate the radial velo-
city of this move towards
the observer. Go To 9.
i
9. Return required information
to the calling program.
Figure 10. The Movement Subroutine (MOVE).
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Code 1 vegetation, no reduction
Code 2 vegetation, velocity reduced by 10%
Code 3 vegetation, velocity reduced by 30%
Code 4 vegetation, velocity reduced by 50%.
Utilizing the adjusted speed of intruder movement and
the computed distance of the move, the time required for the
intruder to complete this move is calculated. This time
becomes the target availability time used by the radar and
the visual detection routines.
In order to calculate the radial velocity of the intru-
der towards the observation device the change in the target-
to-observer range as a result of the current move is
calculated. The radial velocity is then computed by
multiplying the adjusted intruder velocity by the ratio of
change in range to distance traveled.
Upon completion of the above calculations required
information along with program control is returned to the
calling program.
F. THE SENSOR DETECTION ROUTINE
The basic logic used in the unattended ground sensor
detection model (SENTEC) is outlined in Figure 11. This
subroutine is called by the main program after each move
made by an intruder group.
In order to save time during a computer run of the
simulation, the first check made by this subroutine is an
approximate determination of the intruder's proximity to
any sensor string. To accomplish this, it is determined
52

1.. Called from the Main
Program. Go To 2.
i
2. Compare the intruder's
coordinates with coordin- 5,
ates of center sensor of
Strings 1 through 10. Go
To 3. .
3. If intruder is not located
within 400 meters in X & Y
direction of center sensor, 6
Go To 4. Otherwise, Go To
'
i
4. If this is last string to
be checked, return control
to the Main Program. 7




to location of each sensor
in string. If intruder is
in the same grid square as
one of the sensors , Go To
6. Otherwise, Go To 4.
1
Draw a random number. If
random number is less than
sensor probability of
detection. Go To 7. Other-
wise, Go To 4.
Call detection subroutine.
Upon return of control, Go
To 4.
Figure 11. The Sensor Detection Routine (SENTEC)
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if the intruder is within 400 meters in both the X and Y
direction of the center sensor of the string. This check is
made sequentially for all ten sensor strings each time an
intruder group moves. If an intruder is within 400 meters
of the center sensor of the string, a more detailed check
of the intruder's proximity to the sensors of the string is
made.
To accomplish the detailed check, the intruder's loca-
tion coordinates are compared to the location coordinates of
each of the three sensors of the string. In accordance with
the assumptions relating to unattended ground sensor detec-
tions, the coordinates of the intruder must exactly match
those of a remote sensor in order for there to be a chance
of detection. If the coordinates match, indicating that
the intruder is located in a 100 meter square protected by
a ser\sor, a random number is drawn. If the random number is
less than or equal to 0.4526 (the detection probability
derived in the assumption section) , a detection is declared
and control is passed to the Detection Subroutine.
G. THE DECISION SUBROUTINE
In accordance with the rationale described in Chapter
III, an arbitrary decision rule requiring two indicated
detections by any combination of devices within a base-to-
target range of 500 meters was adopted. To represent this
decision process, the decision subroutine (DETECT) is called
by any of the detection routines (RATECT, VITECT, or SENTEC)
when an individual detection occurs.
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Upon receiving the information relating to the detection,
this decision subroutine stores the base-to-target range of
the detection and the identification of the specific detect-
ing device. This detection information is then compared
with each previous detection of this intruder group. If no
combination of detections satisfies the decision rule, con-
trol is returned to the calling subroutine. If, however, a
combination of individual detections satisfies the two
detection, 500 meter decision rule, a formal detection is
declared. The base-to-target range at which the second
detection occurred and the identity of the specific devices
furnishing tiie required two detections are printed. The main
program is signaled that a formal detection has been made
of the current intruder group. This group is deleted from
the program and infiltration is initiated on the next
intruder route.
The program described in this chapter was used to
simulate the base defense problem. The results obtained
using data from eight different deployments are presented
and discussed in the following chapter.
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VI. AN INVESTIGATION OF SELECTED DEPLOYMENT DOCTRINES
This chapter contains the results of computer simulation
of the base defense problem using various doctrines for
deployment of the sensor systems. An attempt to compare the
merits of the deployment schemes is made using game theory
as an analytic tool.
In order to compare the results from each deployment
scheme it seems reasonable to select a measure or measures
of effectiveness which view the base defense problem from
the standpoint of the base commander. What results would
he desire from an integrated sensor system?
First, the system should have a high probability of
detecting infiltrators before they reach a position from
which they can attack the base camp. Therefore, the first
measure of effectiveness would appear to be the percentage
of infiltraticn groups detected.
Because the infiltrators might launch a standoff attack
against the base camp, the base commander's second consider-
ation might well be the detection of infiltration groups at
the greatest possible range. Therefore, a second measure
of effectiveness of a deployment scheme could be the range
at which an intruder group is detected, given that such a
detection occurs.
The relative importance of these two measures of effec-
tiveness should normally depend on the tactical situation
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which confronts a specific base commander. Such factors as
terrain characteristics, base camp type, and enemy capabil-
ities should vary the importance of these two measures.
The following sections contain a description of the
doctrines used to deploy the sensor systems tested in this
study, a graphical representation of the deployment of
individual sensors in each simulation series, and the
results of twenty-five iterations of twelve simulated infil-
trations against each deployed system. The results obtained
from each of the schemes tested are first presented indi-
vidually with only general analysis of specific results -
that is, obvious strengths or weaknesses. A comparative
analysis of the deployments utilizing the two measures of
effectiveness described above is presented at the end of the
chapter.
A. SIMULATION SERIES 1.
The officer deploying the sensors for Simulation Series 1
was furnished the following doctrine statement to use as
guidance.
"Radars and visual devices are [to be] used as a
primary surveillance means of the area beyond the base
perimeter. Isolated detection devices are [to be]
placed at or near areas masked from line-of-sight for
early detection of intruders as they approach the base."
This statement of sensor deployment doctrine was drawn from
a U.S. Army Field Manual entitled Base Defense .
The approximate locations of the sensors deployed under
this guidance are shown in Figure 12. The coordinate loca-







Three Element Sensor String
Center Scan
Orientation Indicated
Figure 12. Approximate Location of Devices
in Simulation Series 1.
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be found in Appendix B. A summary of the detection results
using this particular sensor deployment is given below in
Table I.
In reading this table and the tables that follow in this
chapter an explanation of the various columns would appear
to be helpful. The upper portion of the table summarizes
the history of each of the twelve intruder groups. (The
specific route used by each intruder group was shown earlier
in Figure 3.) The third column indicates the number of
times each group was formally (using the two detection, 500
meter decision rule) detected out of twenty-five infiltra-
tion attempts. The fourth column indicates the average
base-to-target range at which the group was detected given
that it was detected. The fifth column shows the average
range of detection when undetected intruders are assigned
a detection range of zero. These summary values will be
useful later in comparing results of deployment schemes.
Because of the two-decection decision rule, the total number
of detections registered is twice the sum of the third
column, e.g., in Table I the sum of the third column is 144
but since two detections are required to obtain a formal
detection, there were in fact 288 detections recorded in
this simulation.
The second part of the table shows the relative contri-
bution of each type of sensor system to the results obtained
in this simulation series. Although each individual detec-




DETECTION RESULTS OF SIMULATION SERIES 1
Intruder Times Times Ave Range of Overall Range
Group Nuinber Available Detected Detection Detection
1 25 15 1507.4 904.4
2 25 24 2162.1 2075.6
3 25 0.0 0.0
4 25 4 806.2 129.0
5 25 0.0 0.0
6 25 0.0 0.0
7 25 25 2630.8 2630.8
9 25 8 2279.9 729.6
10 25 18 744.7 536.2
11 25 3 223.6 26.8
12 25 23 1947.0 1791.3
Total 300 144







Visual 288. 69 24.0
Remote Sensor 288. 5 1.7
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output from the computer simulation, only those detections
contributing to a formal detection are reflected in the
summary figures in the tables.
Of interest in the results above is the fact that
intruder Groups 3, 5, and S, all traveling in relatively
open terrain, were never detected. This could be because
line - of - sight problems in the placement of the radars
and visual devices which were targeted against that region
of their infiltrations precluded better results against these
groups. Although their routes lay in fairly open terrain,
terrain masks near the base camp could have interfered with
the line sensors.
It can be noted that the unattended (remote) ground
sensors were relatively ineffective in this deployment
scheme. It would appear that the wide dispersal of the
sensor strings suggested by this doctrine will be most
successful when the deployer of the devices correctly
guesses the routes to be used by the infiltrators. This
was evidently not the case in this particular scheme.
In judging the deployment of the sensors in this simu-
latio series it can be seen that only 144 formal detections
were obtained out of 300 chances for a detection rate of
48%. Detecting less than half of the infiltrators would
probably not be considered an unqualified success even in
a simulated base defense problem.
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B. SIMULATION SERIES 2
In Simulation Series 2, the officer deploying the
sensors was furnished the following doctrine statement to
use as guidance.
"Radars and visual devices are [to be] used as a
primary surveillance means. Unattended ground sensors
should be utilized to cover likely avenues of approach
for early warning regardless of line-of-sight con-
siderations . "
This doctrine statement varies from the first in that
unattended ground sensor deployment is not required to be
limited to areas masked from line-of-sight, although they
are still to be used for early warning.
The approximate locations of the sensors deployed under
this guidance are shown in Figure 13. A summary of the
detection results using this particular sensor deployment
is given below in Table II.
Note that although the number of detections has increased
significantly (from 144 to 175) , Groups 5 and 6 and addition-
ally Group 4 have escaped detection. A study of the siimmary
results in Table II and the deployment diagram for this
simulation series suggests that the night observation devices
may have been placed in areas masked from most of the infil-
tration routes, especially those groups whose routes lay in
the second quadrant. Although the doctrinal guidance for
deployment of the line sensors in Simulation Series 2 did
not vary from that used in Simulation Series 1, the deploy-
ment of the radars and the visual devices was changed. It









.Three Element Sensor String
Center Scan
Orientation Indicated
Figure 13. Approximate Location of Devices




DETECTION RESULTS OF SIMULATION SERIES 2
Intruder Times Times Ave Range of Overall Range
Group Number Available Detected Detection Detection
1 25 16 1703.0 1089.9
2 25 21 1823.9 1532.1
3 25 21 1828.4 1535.8
4 25 0.0 0.0
5 25 0.0 0.0
6 25 0.0 0.0
7 25 24 2613.3 2508.8
8 25 25 2736.7 2736.7
9 25 9 2013.2 724.8
10 25 25 1524.9 1524.9
11 25 12 1944.1 933.2








Visual 350. 13 3.7
Remote Sensor 350. 15 4.3
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was markedly superior to that used in the first series while
the deployment of the visual devices appears to have been
inferior. It can be assumed from a study of the deployment
diagram that the radars have been placed in a manner to
increase their line-of-sight capability in their areas of
search.
The detection percentage for deployment of the sensor
systems in Simulation Series 2 was 58%. The more liberal
guidelines for deploying the unattended ground sensors has
increased the effectiveness of this sensor system over that
of the first simulation series. However, again, it can be
conjectured that the wide dispersal of these devices will
not result in many detections unless the deploying officer
has knowledge of likely infiltration routes.
C. SIMULATION SERIES 3
The officer deploying the sensors for Simulation Series
3 was furnished the following doctrine statement to use as
guidance.
"Radars should always be oriented only towards open
terrain and overlapped in coverage if necessary. Visual
devices and unattended ground sensors should be used to
cover the areas not considered for radar coverage."
This doctrine statement is a radical departure from the first
two considered in that the orientation of the ground sur-
veillance radars is specifically directed towards only open
terrain with the night observation devices and the unattended
ground sensors used to cover those areas which were not con-
sidered open enough for radar use.
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Tbe approximate locations of the sensors employed under
this guxdance. are shown in Figure 14^ A sununary of the
detect±oii resnits nntng- this part±cuXar sensor deployment
is given below in Table III.
Since it achieved only 136 detections out of 300 chances,
the deployment of sensor: syst.ems in thxs serxes does not
appear to have been very success fuJ.^ The most striking
value in Table ZXI is the total detections acquired by the
unattended, grounri sensors^ It can. be seen from the deploy-
ment diagram in Figure 14 that these sensors are again
widely dispersed although this dispersal was not required
specifically by the doctrine statement.. These results
appear to reinforce the conjecture that widely dispersed
remote sensors will not be effective in a problem such as
this unless the deploying officer has knowledge of likely
infiltration routes.
Although the radar coverage was limited to open terrain
by the doctrine statement, it can be noted from the diagram
that only seventy degrees of the base defense circle are
devoid af radar- coverage These areas contain major- portions
of the infiltration routes of the fo\ir intruder groups who
had the most success in infiltrating - groups 4, 5, 10, and
11 This, again, points to the poor location of the visual
devices which, were requixed to cover these areas
TT^Tify d^r.loyment scheme resulting in. a detectxon perr-








Three Element Sensor String
Center Scan
Orientation Indicated
Figure 14. Approximate Location of Devices




DETECTION RESULTS OF SIMULATION SERIES 3
Intruder Times Times Ave Range of Overall Range
Group Nioinber Available Detected Detection Detection
1 25 11 991.8 436.4
2 25 25 2249.6 2249.6
3 25 6 680.7 163.4
4 25 0.0 0.0
5 25 1 989.9 39.6
6 25 9 1109.7 399.5
7 25 25 2907.8 2907.8
8 25 25 2804.9 2804.9
9 25 11 1737.5 764.5
10 25 0.0 0.0
11 25 0.0 0.0
12 25 23 2002.4 1842.2
Total 300 136







Visual 272. 38 14.0
Remote Sensor 272. 0.0
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D. SIMULATION SERIES 4
The officer deploying the sensors for Simulation Series
4 was furnished the following doctrine statement.
"Visual devices should always be oriented towards
open terrain and overlapped in coverage if necessary.
Radars and unattended ground sensors should be used to
cover the areas not considered for visual coverage."
It should be noted that this doctrine statement is a rever-
sal of the doctrine statement in Simulation Series 3, since
the roles of the ground surveillance radars and the night
observation devices have been interchanged.
The approximate locations of the sensors employed under
this guidance are shown in Figure 15. A summary of the
detection results using this particular sensor deployment
is given below in Table IV.
The results of Simulation Series 4 are much the same
overall as those obtained in Simulation Series 3 with only
an increase of three detections for a total of 139 detec-
tions out of 300 chances. The unattended ground sensors
were again widely dispersed and were again relatively
ineffective.
It is interesting to note that the first four intruder
groups, all with infiltration routes in the relatively open
first and second quadrants, were never detected by the
sensors deployed in the manner shown in Figure 15. It would
appear that the visual devices oriented to 75° and 350° were
masked by some prominent terrain features.
Also of interest is the fact that Groups 1, 8,9 and 10
















Figure 15. Approximate Location of Devices




DETECTION RESULTS OF SIMULATION SERIES 4
Intruder Times Times Ave Range of Overall Range
Group Number Available Detected Detection Detection
1 25 0.0 0.0
2 25 0.0 0.0
3 25 0.0 0.0
4 25 0.0 0.0
5 25 7 200.0 56.0
6 25 17 864.8 588.1
7 25 11 1172.5 515.9
8 25 25 2797.4 2797.4
9 25 23 2118.4 1949.0
10 25 25 2095.8 2095.8
11 25 13 2604.4 1354.3
12 25 18 2182.8 1571.6
Total 300 139





Visual 278. 71 25.5
Remote Sensor 278. 3 1.1
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detected quite successfully. This seems to indicate that
concentrated radar coverage as used in this deployment scheme
will be quite successful in this problem regardless of the
general characteristics of the terrain.
Although fairly successful in the broken terrain, the
failures of this deployment scheme in the more open terrain
and the low overall percentage of detections of 46% appear
to mitigate against its use.
E. SIMULATION SERIES 5
For Simulation Series 5, the guiding doctrine was:
"Radars and visual devices are [to be] used as a
primary surveillance means. Unattended ground sensors
should be used near base camp to insure that no infil-
tration group penetrates the base itself."
This statement of doctrine is less detailed than others used
in this study with only general location of the unattended
ground sensors specified. The approximate locations of the
sensors deployed in accordance with this doctrine statement
are shown in Figure 16. The results obtained using this
scheme of deployment are found in Table V below.
The results contained in Table V appear to indicate that
the deployment scheme used in Simulation Series 5 is quite
successful. Note that 230 detections were obtained out of
300 chances and every intruder group was detected at least
once.
Especially noteworthy is the improved performance of the






^.... Night Observation Device





Figure 16. Approximate Location of Devices




DETECTION RESULTS OF SIMULATION SERIES 5
Intrude!r Times Times Ave Range of Overall Range
Group Number Available Detected Detection Detection
1 25 20 1036.2 829.0
2 25 24 1802.2 1730.1
3 25 8 597.8 191.3
4 25 20 678.0 542.4
5 25 21 1300.8 1092.7
6 25 18 1269.8 914.3
7 - 25 25 2410.8 2410.8
8 25 25 2780.2 2780.2
9 25 12 1320.2 633.7
10 25 25 1382.1 1382.1
11 25 9 1869.6 673.1
12 25 23 1755.3 1614.8
Total 300 230







Visual 460. 130 28.3
Remote Sensor 460. 33 7.2
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these remote sensors near the base camp appears to improve
their success.
In deploying the line sensors in accordance with the
very general guidelines, the officer seems to have followed
a symmetric rule. Almost all areas are covered by both the
radars and the visual devices. This scheme appears to have
been equally successful in the open and broken terrain.
With a detection percentage of almost 77% the deployment
scheme in Simulation Series 5 appears to be successful.
F. SIMULATION SERIES 6
Deployment guidance in Simulation Series 6 came from
the following statement.
"Radars should always be oriented towards only open
terrain and overlapped in coverage if necessary. Visual
devices should be oriented towards terrain not covered
by the radars. Unattended ground sensors should be
used to cover areas masked from line-of-sight for early
detection of intruders."
This doctrine statement is a combination of that given in
the doctrine statement for Simulation Series 3 for deploy-
ment of ground surveillance radars and night observation
devices and that of Simulation Series 1 for deployment of
unattended ground sensors. The sensors were deployed in
approximately the manner shown in Figure 17. The results
obtained utilizing the deployment scheme of Simulation
Series 6 are shown in Table VI below.
The results of Simulation Series 6 are fairly impressive
with 203 detections out of 300 chances. Only intruder Groups
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Figure 17. Approximate Location of Devices















1 25 20 1134.8 907.8
2 25 25 2355.3 2355.3
3 25 22 1513.2 1331.6
4 25 0.0 0.0
5 25 5 516.0 103.2
6 25 15 909.5 545.7
7 25 23 1729.1 1590.7
8 25 25 2419.0 2419.0
9 25 16 1793.7 1148.0
10 25 22 1382.3 1216.4
11 25 7 2692.6 753.9
12 25 23 2151.3 1979.2
Total 300 203





Visual 406. 58 14.3
Remote Sensor 406. 6 1.5
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There does not appear to be a noticeable difference in the
success of the deployment scheme in relation to the charac-
teristics of terrain used by the infiltrators.
Although the doctrine under which the line sensors were
deployed in this simulation series was identical with that
of Simulation Series 3, the more symmetric deployment in
this series resulted in more successful results. The only
eurea not covered by the radars is located in the second
quadrant and is almost readily identifiable because of the
lack of detection or low average detection ranges of the
infiltration routes - 4, 5, and 6 - in this area.
The wide dispersal of the unattended ground sensors was
again unsuccessful in this series.
The detection percentage of 6 7% resulting from the
deployment scheme used in Simulation Series 6 can be termed
moderately successful.
G. SIMULATION SERIES 7 • •
The officer deploying the sensors for Simulation Series
7 was furnished the following doctrine statement to use as
guidance.
"Radars should always be oriented towards only open
terrain and overlapped in coverage if necessary. Visual
devices should be oriented towards terrain not covered
by the radars. Unattended ground sensors should be used
near base camp to insure that no infiltration group
penetrates the base itself."
"This doctrine statement is exactly the same as that used in
Simulation Series 6 with the exception of the guidance for
deploying the unattended ground sensors. With respect to
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deployment of the unattended ground sensors the statement
is identical to that used in Simulation Series 5. The
approximate location of the sensors in Simulation Series 7
may be found in Figure 18. The detection results obtained
using the deployment scheme of this simulation series are
shown in Table VII below.
Like the results of Simulation Series 5 and Simulation
Series S, those of Series 7 are fairly impressive in terms
of total detections - 199 out of a possible 300. The rel-
ative ineffectiveness of the night observation devices is
evident. These devices were ineffective in Simulation
Series 6 in which they were deployed utilizing the same
doctrine as in this case.
The ground surveillance radars (again deployed almost
symmetrically) were responsible for the bulk of the detec-
tions obtained in this series. A minor weakness in the
second quadrant is again evident, but it is not so striking
as in Simulation Series 6.
An unexpected result of this series was the performance
of the ground surveillance radars. Although the doctrine
for deployment of these sensors was identical to that of
Simulation Series 5 in which these remote sensors enjoyed
comparative success , only ten detections were obtained from
this source in Series 7. A glance at the deployment diagram
contained in Figure 18, however, shows that these sensors
were not concentrated as tightly around the base camp as






Three Element Sensor String
Center Scan
Orientation Indicated
Figure 18. Approximate Location of Devices















1 25 15 2278.4 1367.0
2 25 19 1570.7 1193.7
3 25 22 1710.0 1504.8
4 25 0.0 0.0
5 25 4 920.7 147.3
6 25 22 1343.0 1181.8
7 25 25 2656.9 2656.9
8 25 25 2435.0 2435.0
9 25 25 1670.3 1670.3
10 25 24 1705.9 1637.7
11 25 5 2692.6 538.5
12 25 13 879.2 457.2
Total 300 199





Visual 398. 32 8.0
Remote Sensor 398. 10 2.5
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Simulation Series 7 with a detection percentage of 66%
can be termed moderately successful.
H. SIMULATION SERIES 8
In the final simulation series, the following doctrine
statement was used as guidance.
"Radar coverage should never overlap. Visual device
coverage should never overlap. Unattended ground sensors
should be used to cover likely avenues of approach."
This was the least specific of the eight doctrine statements
used in this study, but was still somewhat restrictive in
respect to deployment of the ground surveillance radars and
the night observation devices. The approximate locations
of the sensors is shown in Figure 19. Results obtained in
Simulation Series 8 are shown in Table VIII below.
The total number of detections obtained using the deploy-
ment scheme of Simulation Series 8 was 133 detections out
of a possible 300. Four intruder groups were undetected in
this series and three more were detected in less than half
their intrusions. This deployment scheme showed lack of
success in all the quadrants and in both open and broken
terrain.
Only the ground surveillance radars , deployed symmetri-
cally, enjoyed any success in this simulation series. The
night observation devices were relatively ineffective.
Once again, the wide dispersal of the unattended ground
sensors resulted in no success.
With a detection rate of only 44%, the deployment scheme
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Figure 19. Approximate Location of Devices




DETECTION RESULTS OF SIMULATION SERIES 8
Intrudeir Times Times Ave Range of Overall Range
Group Nunber Available Detected Detection Detection
1 25 24 1707.5 1639.2
2 25 18 1825.2 1314.1
3 25 0.0 0.0
4 25 0.0 0.0
5 25 0.0 0.0
6 25 0.0 0.0
7 • 25 25 2565.0 2565.0
8 25 25 2851.7 2851.7
9 25 6 2402.7 576.6
10 25 6 2055.1 493.2
11 25 6 1637.8 393.1
12 25 23 1744.2 1604.7
Total 300 133





Visual 266. 18 6.8
Remote Sensor 266. 0.0
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Results of Individual Analysis
Although concerned about the reasons for the various
results obtained in each simulation series, a summary of
the analysis of the individual results is limited to the
following: total detections, percentage of detections, and
the number of intruder groups undetected in twenty-five
attempts
.
The following table contains these summary totals.
TABLE IX
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL SIMULATION SERIES
Simulation Total Percentage Number of Groups
Series Detections of Detections Undetected
1 144 48% 3
2 175 58% 3
3 136 45% 3
4 139 46% 4
5 230 77% -
6 203 67% 1
7 199 66% 1
8 133 44% 4
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The examination of the results obtained in each simula-
tion series was helpful in learning how systems performed
in each case and it is meaningful to compare these results.
I. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TESTED DOCTRINES
In this section analysis of the results of the eight
simulation series is performed in a comparative manner.
Two methods of analysis, one using game theory and the
other using decision theory, are used to compare three
different summary results of the eight simulation series -
detections, average detection range, and overall detection
range.
Before beginning the comparative analysis, it would
appear helpful to review the basic results obtained from the
individual analysis of each series and the scenario used to
simulate the base defense problem.
1, The Scenario
In analyzing the results of the simulations conduc-
ted in a comparative sense it is necessary to recall that
all results are dependent on the scenario that was construc-
ted in order to derive a model for the base defense problem.
The scenario that was used in this study required
the deployment of a specified integrated sensor system in
accordance with the guidance furnished in a doctrine state-
ment. The infiltration threat used to test the deployment
schemes was constant throughout the various simulations and
consisted of twelve intruder groups utilizing preselected
86

infiltration routes which were roughly distributed uniformly
throughout the base defense area. It was assumed that the
infiltrator had a general knowledge of the sensor capability
of the base but no knowledge of specific capabilities or
locations of the individual devices.
2 . Comparative Analysis Using Number of Detections and
a Two-person, Zero Sum Game
In attempting to select the doctrine (or doctrines)
which best fulfill the measures of effectiveness outlined
above, an approach which was suggested seems both mathe-
matically and esthetically satisfying. This approach
utilizes the framework of basic game theory to cast the
options available to the base commander and those available
to the infiltrator into the form of a two-person, zero sum
game. This formulation, often called a rectangular game,
requires a choice among several options by the two partici-
pants in the game. These choices, made individually and
without knowledge of the opponent's choice, define a payoff
to one of the players based on the value of the cell desig-
nated by the choices made.
Considering first the results with number of detections
obtained as the measure of effectiveness, number of detec-
tions obtained, the results of the computer simulation are













4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12
15 24 4 24 25 8 18 3 23
16 21 21 24 25 9 25 12 22
11 25 6 1 9 25 25 11 23
7 17 11 25 23 25 13 18
20 24 8 20 21 18 25 25 12 25 9 23
20 25 22 5 15 23 25 12 25 9 23
15 19 22 4 22 25 25 25 24 5 13
24 18 25 25 6 6 6 23
The cell values represent the number of detections
obtained using a particular doctrine in attempting twenty-
five detections of a specific intruder. Since the cell
values represent a "payoff" to the base commander, he will
attempt to maximize the cell chosen, while the intruder will
attempt to minimize the cell value and thereby his chance of
detection. Although it is unlikely that the intruder would
have such specific information available in choosing his
route, it must be assumed that he will act rationally based
on his knowledge of the terrain and his general knowledge of
his opponent's detection system.
In selecting the optimum strategies for both players, it
must be remembered that the base commander wishes to maxi-
mize his payoff (the cell values) , while the intruder wishes
to minimize it. By noting the minimum value in each row,
and the maximum value in each column, a search is conducted
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for a "saddle-point." This method is based on pessimism by
both players, that is, they search for the worst they can do
by choosing each strategy. If a point is found that is both
the maximum value of its column and the minimum value of its
row, then a saddlepoint is found and the game is solved.
Unfortunately, in this case no saddlepoint exists.
Next, an attempt is made to eliminate doctrines and
routes based on "dominance." This method makes use of the
rationale that if any column or any row is clearly superior
to another column or row from the standpoint of the player
using it, it is "dominated" by the superior strategy. It can
be noted that Row 1 is dominated by Row 5 , that is , from the
standpoint of the base commander, every payoff in Row 5 is
greater or equal to that in Row 1. Therefore, Row 1 may be
eliminated from consideration, since no matter what route
the intruder chooses, the base commander can always do
better by choosing Doctrine 5. Now Column 5 is dominated by
Column 4, eliminating Column 5. Column 1 is dominated by
Column 4, eliminating Column 1. Now Row 8 is dominated by
Row 5, eliminating Row 8. Column 10 is dominated by Column
11; Column 8 is dominated by Column 9; Columns 2, 7, and 12
are dominated by Column 4, eliminating Columns 10, 8, 2, 7,
and 12.
No more elimination by domination is possible and the




3 4 6 9 11
Doctrines
2 21 9 12
3 6 9 11
4 17 23 13
5 9 20 18 12 9
6 22 15 16 7
7 22 22 25 5
Because of the success of Doctrine Five against Route
Four, it must be a candidate for the optimum doctrine. How-
ever, neglecting Route Four, Doctrine Seven appears clearly
superior to the rest (although weak against Route Eleven)
.
From these reasons Doctrines Five and Seven appear to be the
best of the eight for satisfying the measure of number of
detections. Although not a purpose of the study, a conclu-
sion regarding the best routes for the intruder to use may
be drawn. From examination of the matrix it appears that
Routes 4 and 11 are the best for use by the intruder.
3. Comparative Analysis Using Number of Detections and
Decision Theory
Before leaving the examination of the results of the
different doctrines based on the number of detections
obtained, an approach which does not require any assumption
about the rationality of the opponent might be interesting.
Such an approach assumes only that the specific route which
will be selected by the infiltrator is unknown and no
knowledge of a possible basis of selection of the route is
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available to the base commander. Therefore, the probabil-
ities associated with the route selection process will be
considered to be equally likely, an assumption often called
the Lagrange approach to the decision process under
uncertainty.
The commander may also be interested in the number of
detections he will forfeit by choosing a doctrine which does
not provide the maximum number of detections of an intruder
using a particular route. This method of decision analysis
was proposed by Savage in 1951 and the amount lost by
selecting the row in which the chosen column produced less .
than maximum payoff is called the regret .
The following analysis will make use of both of these
decision methods. The base commander's regret will be
calculated for each possible event (combination of doctrine
and route) . Instead of selecting the minimum of the maximum
regrets associated with each doctrine as is normally done
in the regret approach to decision making, the assumption
of equally likely events will be used in this process. The
sum of the base commander's forfeits for choosing each doc-
trine will be calculated over all possible intruder routes
(within the scenario of this study)
.
Under this approach, the doctrine which minimizes this
average of forfeits would be considered to be the best under
the assumption of no knowledge of the route selection process,
Mathematically, this process can be written as follows
for the i doctrine;
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Sum of Forfeits = 1 [ (Max a, .) - a. .]kj
j (columns)
Intruder Routes12345678910 11 12
Doctrines
1 9 1 22 16 21 22 1 17 7 10
2 8 4 1 20 21 22 1 16 1 1
3 13 16 20 20 13 14 25 13
4 24 25 22 20 14 5 13 2 5
5 4 1 14 4 13 4
6 4 20 16 7 2 9 3 6
7 9 6 20 17 1 8 10












From the average forfeits it appears evident that Doc-
trine Five is superior to the other doctrines with respect
to detections. In fact, since the forfeits can be inter-
preted as detections lost because of using a particular
doctrine instead of the best doctrine for each route, it can
be seen that use of Doctrine Five for all cases reduces the
chance of detecting an entering intruder by only 40/300 or
13.4 percent of the chance of detecting with perfect infor-
mation about the route selected by the intruder.
4. Comparative Analysis Using Average Detection Range_
and a Two-person, Zero Sum Game
A second measure of effectiveness proposed for the
integrated sensor deployment problem was the range at which




In comparing the results of the simulations with this
measure of effectiveness the same two analytic methods will
be used.
The basic two-person, zero sum game matrix for this phase
of the analysis is as follows (note the lack of a saddle-
point) .
Intruder Routes









1507 2162 806 2564 2631 2279 745 224 1947
1703 1823 1828 2613 2737 2013 1525 1944 2005
992 2250 681 990 1110 2908 2805 1737 2002
200 865 1172 2797 2118 2096 2604 2183
1036 1802 598 678 1301 1270 2411 2780 1320 1382 1870 1755
1135 2355 1513 516 909 1729 2419 1794 1382 2693 2151
2278 1571 1710 921 1343 2657 2435 1670 1705 2693 879
1707 1825 2565 2852 2403 2055 1638 1744
Using the dominance method again it is noted that Columns
1, 2, 1, 8, 9, and 12 are dominated by Column 4 which means
the infiltrator will do better to choose Route 4 over any of
the dominated routes no matter which doctrine is chosen.
Row 8 is dominated by Row 4 and Row 6 is dominated by Row 7.















200 865 2096 2604
598 678 1301 1270 1382 1870
1710 921 1343 1706 2693
Again, Doctrines 5 and 7 appear to-be superior overall
to the other doctrines.
5. Comparative Analysis Using Average Detection Range
and Decision Theory
To use the concept of the commander's loss or forfeit
the regret values are calculated as before and the following
matrix is obtained.




7 8 9 10 11 12
1 771 193 1828 1301 1343 344 221 184 B51 2469 236
2 575 532 806 1301 1343 295 115 450
571 749 178
0)3 1286 105 1147 806 311 242 47 726
2096 2693 181
CD
22 78 2355 1828 806 1101 478 1736 55 345 89
0^ 1242 553 12 30 128 73 497
72 1143 714 823 428
p
6 1143 315 806 785 434 1179 443 669
714 B04
7 784 118 806 380 251 417 793 390
1304














Here Doctrine Seven exhibits the lowest total forfeit,
although the order of magnitude of the differences is
small. Doctrine Six has the second lowest forfeit total
-
this doctrine also had the second lowest regret total when
numbers of detections were considered.
6. Comparative Analysis Using Overall Average Detection
Range and a Two-person, Zero Sum Game
In an attempt to resolve the problem of selecting
the optimum doctrine using both measures of effectiveness a
third criterion was examined. This was the overall average
range of detection; so named because nondetection of a
target was counted as a detection at zero range. Therefore,
the averages reflect not only success in detecting the
target at a long range, but also success in detecting the
target at all. The game matrix containing this summary
data
as payoffs appears below.




7 8 9 10 11 12
1 904 2075 129 2462 2631 730
536 27 1791








4 56 588 516 2797 1949
2096 1354 1572
u
829 1730 191 542 1093 914 2411 2780 634 1382
673 1615
°6 908 2355 1332 103 546 1591 2419 1148 1216 754 1979
7 1367 1194 1505 147 118 2 2657 2435 1670
1638 538 457




Although the game matrix appears quite formidable, it
can quickly be reduced by dominance to a two by two game
matrix. Note first that Columns 1, 2, 1, 8, 9, 10, and 12
are dominated by Column 4. After their elimination Rows
1, 3, and 8 are dominated by Row 5. Eliminating these Rows,
Columns 11, 6, and 5 are dominated by Column 4. Finally,
Rows 6 and 7 are dominated by Row 2 leaving the two by two




Using the methods described in basic game theory ref-
erences [8] , the following set of inequalities and equations
is used to finathe optimum strategies of the opponents and
the expected payoff of the game.
Let X2 represent the proportion of the time Doctrine 2
should be used and X^ the proportion Doctrine 5 should be
used. Similarly, Y3 represents the proportion of the time
Route 3 is used and Y^ represents the proportional use of
Route 4. Finally, let V represent the expected value
of the





_X2 + X3 = 1 , Y3 -h Y4 = 1 ,
1536X2 + 191X5 > V
X2 + 542X5 > V
I536Y3 + Y^ > V ,
I9IY3 + 542Y^ > V
The solution of this system of equations and inequalities
was found to be:
X2 = 0.185 , X5 = 0.815,
Y3 = 0.288 , Y^ = 0.712,
V = 422.
Which indicates that if both opponents use optimal strategies
with respect to this mixed summary game, the base commander
should use Doctrine Five 81.5 percent of the time and
Doctrine Two the remainder and he can expect to detect an
intruder at a range of 442 meters if the intruder uses the
optimal strategy in selecting his infiltration routes.
Because of the basic structure of game theory which led
to
this solution, it can be shown that the expected
detection
range will be no worse than 442 meters as long as the
base
commander follows the optimal strategy and will be even
better than 442 meters if the intruder uses any but
his
optimal strategy for selecting infiltration routes.
Having given an example of methods of analysis that
may
be used to interpret the results obtained when using
the
modeling and simulation technique, the conclusions
and
areas of suggested study resulting from this study
are
presented in the next chapter.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
In this chapter the general conclusions resulting from
this study of the doctrinal requirements for sensor system
deployment in a base defense situation are presented. In
addition, several areas for future study in this area are
suggested.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions which have resulted from this study are
of a general nature, since the use of only one officer to
place the sensor systems in accordance with the various
doctrines precluded recommendations of any individual doctrine
within the framework of the situation presented. The con-
struction and use of the model to evaluate the doctrines
through computer simulation has led to the belief that this
method is useful in obtaining relatively quick evaluations
of alternative tactics or doctrines.
The method used in this study - modeling a base defense
problem by simplifying a typical situation and simulating
the problem with various doctrinal alternatives - requires
careful attention to the assumptions, explicit and implicit,
required; the location in which the problem is simulated;
and the statement of the variables affecting the success of
the various systems simulated. This approach necessitates
tedious collection of data necessary to such a simulation.
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especially that describing the physical site of th€
One of the limitations of an effort such as this is
level of effort required to exercise the model in a
different simulated terrains . However, once a model has
been constructed and programmed for the computer, it offers
a fairly easy avenue for exploring many variations of deploy-
ment schemes, system performance values, and decision rules.
Carefully documented and stored on tape or cards, the
programmed model can be exercised with little effort as a
need arises.
The results obtained from the simulations of the various
doctrines appear to indicate that a doctrine which does not
restrict the placement of ground surveillance radars and
night observaticn devices leads to a more effective employ-
ment of the systems. The unattended ground sensors, however,
were most effective when deployed near base camp.
The following general conclusions are presented as a
result of this study.
1. The Method
A fairly non-complex model used in conjunction with
computer simulation can provide rapid indications of optimal
tactics or doctrines to be used in small scale engagements.
2. The Results
A doctrine which does not restrict the placement of
ground surveillance radars and night observation devices and
requires the placement of unattended ground sensors near the
base perimeter appears to be the best guidance for a base
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commander in a defensive situation similar to that of this
study. This conclusicn results from the success with the
line sensors obtained with those doctrines which did not
limit line sensor deployment and the obvious lack of success
with the remote sensors when using widely dispersed deploy-
ment. The highly successful deployment using Doctrine 5
supports both of these methods.
B. EXTENSIONS
Four areas for possible further study that were suggested
during the preparation of this paper are described below.
1. Increased Sample Size
The placement of the systems in accordance with the
various doctrines should be accomplished by several quali-
fied officers before more specific judgements of doctrine
value can be made. Although such placement is time consum-
ing to the subject officer and to the data collector who
must digitize the placements from overlays , several trials
would be necessary in order to arrive at more specific
conclusions.
2. Radar Range Law
The assumption of range independence in ground sur-
veillance radar detection probability is questionable,
especially when considering the dominance exhibited by three
such devices in the results of this study. Only minor
modification of the radar detection subroutine would be





A parametric study of the relative importance of the
three types of detection systems would be of interest. Com-
bined with system cost data available in the catalog of
STANO systems, this study could provide an indication of a
cost effective mix of sensor systems in a base defense role.
4. Command and Control
As was mentioned earlier in this paper, incorporation
of command and control limitations was not attempted in this
study. A study of the optimal control procedures to be used
with an integrated sensor system could be accomplished with
this model with only minor modifications necessary. Such
procedures should include decision rules for when to concen-
trate sensor coverage in an area, an optimal decision rule
for determining when an actual detection has been made, and
the alternatives available to the base commander upon detec-
tion of an intruder.
The simplified modeling technique used in conjunction
with computer simulation appears to satisfy the requirement
of the U.S. Army for "useful results in a few days or weeks."
Retaining an awareness for the limitations of this method,
the military analyst can, nonetheless, provide rapid and
documented problem results to be used to reduce the number







The instructions that follow were furnished to the
officer who deployed the individual sensors in the eight
simulatiai series described in this study. The officer
was supplied with the instructions, a map of the area, and
blank overlays, and had no knowledge of the preselected
infiltration routes.
The purpose of this exercise is to place the components
of an integrated sensor system for base defense in accordance
with several different general doctrines for sensor use. The
problem consists of detecting small infiltration groups
advancing towards a base location from any point on the
compass. You have been asked to aid in this test because
you have knowledge of U.S. Army doctrine relating to base
defense, but have no knowledge of preselected infiltration
routes. Supplied with the detection equipment enumerated
below, you will be required to place these systems in
accordance with:
(1) The general doctrine supplied.
(2) The parameters of the systems.
(3) Knowledge of terrain from a map reconnaissance.
(4) The constraints of each type of system.
For each doctrine supplied please note on the accompany-
ing overlay your placement of the following detection systems:
1. Ground Surveillance Radar. <^o
a. Symbol to be used: P^"*^ where the base repre-
sents the exact location and the 90° represents
the center scan orientation counterclockwise
from East.
b. Number to be utilized: 3.
c. Parameters:
(1) Range of Detection: Minimum of 400 meters,
maximum of 3200 meters.
(2) Antenna Mast: Antenna located on Mast of
20 meters height.
(3) Sector Scan Width: 110°.
(4) Foliage Penetration: Sixty percent of
optimum in moderate foliage, twenty percent
of optimum in heavy foliage.
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(5) Allowable Locations: Not more than 500
meters from center of base camp noted on
map.
2. Visual Detection Device.
a. Symbol to be used: ^ 90°, where the center of
the triangle represents the exact location and
the 90° represents the center scan orientation
counterclockwise from East.
b. Number to be utilized: 4.
c. Parameters:
(1) Range of Detection: 1600 meters.
(2) Sector: 90°
(3) Foliage Penetration: eighty percent of
optimum capability in moderate foliage,
forty percent of optimum capability in
heavy foliage.
(4) Allowable Locations: Not more than 1200
meters from center of base camp noted on
map.
3. Unattended Ground Sensors.
a. Symbol to be used: OOO , UGS will be employed
in strings of three located approximately 200
meters apart. The circles represent the sensors.
Strings need not be straight.
b. Number to be utilized: 10 strings.
c. Parameters:
(1) Radius of Detection: 40 meters.
(2) Type: Seismic/Acoustic.
(3) Allowable Locations: Deployed not further
than 5000 meters from center of base camp.
Map Reconnais sance : Before placing the detection devices a
reconnaissance ot tte Base Defense Area should be conducted
utilizing rhe map provided. For the purposes of this exer-
cise all indicated man-made structures on the map should be
ignored with the exception of roads, bridges, and railroad
tracks. The threat of infiltration into the Base Defense
Area should be considered as uniform throughout 360 and
constrained only by natural terrain channeling. Particular
attention should be paid to likely avenues of approach and
the line-of-sight problem in observing them. The Base
Defense Area extends out 5000 meters from the center ot the
base camp as noted on the map.
Doctrines to be Used in Placing the Detection Devices: The
detection devices provided as the Base Commander s resources
should be placed in the beet locations in accordance with
each of the followirg doctrine statements. Some doctrine
statements may be more specific than others. If ^he
doctrine statement does not specify the exact method ot
employment of a system, employ it based on the system s
parameters and your experience. Use the numbered overlays
to denote system employment.
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Doctrine #1. Radars and visual devices are used as a
primary surveillance means of the area beyond the base
perimeter. Isolated detection devices (UGS) are placed at
or near areas masked from line-of-sight for early detection
of intruders as they approach the base.
Doctrine #2. Radars and visual devices are used as a
primary surveillance means. Unattended Ground Sensors
should be utilized to cover likely avenues of approach for
early warning regardless of line-of-sight considerations.
Doctrine #3. Radars should always be oriented towards only
open terrain and overlapped in coverage if necessary.
Visual devices and Unattended Ground Sensors should be used
to cover the areas not considered for radar coverage.
Doctrine #4. Visual devices should always be oriented
towards open terrain and overlapped in coverage if necessary.
Radars and Unattended Ground Sensors should be used to cover
the areas not considered for visual coverage.
Doctrine #5. Radars and visual devices are used as a
primary surveillance means. Unattended Ground Sensors should
be used near base camp to insure that no infiltration group
penetrates the base itself.
Doctrine #6. Radars should always be oriented towards only
open terrain and overlapped in coverage if necessary. Visual
devices should be oriented towards terrain not covered by
radars. Unattended Ground Sensors should be used to cover
areas masked from line-of-sight for early detection of
intruders
.
Doctrine #7. Radars should always be oriented towards only
open terrain and overlapped in coverage if necessary.
Visual devices should be oriented towards terrain not
covered by radars. Unattended Ground Sensors should be used
near base camp to insure that no infiltration group pene-
trates the base itself.
Doctrine #8. Radar coverage should never overlap. Visual
device coverage should never overlap. Unattended Ground
Sensors should be used to cover likely avenues of approach.
When placing devices in accordance with one of the
_
doctrine statements try not to compare the doctrine being
used to any other doctrine stated above. Consider the





EXACT LOCATIONS OF DEVICES
TABLE X
LOCATION OF DETECTION DEVICES UNDER DOCTRINE 1
Radar Device #
Location of Device Center Scan
OrientationX= Y=
1 53 51 0°
2 50 52 110°
3 49 50 210°
Visual Device # Location of
Device Center Scan
OrientationX= Y=
1 57 51 450
2 51 59 135°
3 46 41 225°
4 52 50 315°
Sensor
Strina #
Sensor #1 Sensor #2 Sensor =i 3
—
X= Y= X= Y= X= Y=
1 92 39 94 40 94 43
2 76 64 79 64 81 61
3 80 57 78 55 79 54
4 70 37 70 34 70 31
5 52 87 53 88 55 89
^
6 50 34 53 33 55 33
7 40 40 40 44 41 48
8 35 71 33 68 36 66
9 33 17 35 17 37 17




LOCATION OF DETECTION DEVICES UNDER DOCTRINE 2
Radar Device # T.nnafion of Device
Center Scan
OrientationX= Y=
1 52 51 315°
2 48 56 55°
3 50 50 190°
Visual Device #
Location of Device Center Scan
OrientationX= Y=
1 52 51 150°
2 51 50 70°
3 46 43 250°
4 46 43 350°
Sensor
String #
Sensor #1 \ Sensor # Sensor #3
X= Y= X= Y= X= Y=
1 90 45 90 47 89 48
2 76 66 78 65 79 64
3 76 54 78 55 79 56
4 69 37 69 40 70 41
5 52 45 53 47 55 48
6 51 20 51 22 52 24
7 42 60 43 61 43 64
8 41 44 42 46 42 49
9 34 17 36 18 37 19




LOCATION OF DETECTION DEVICES UNDER DOCTRINE 3
Radar Device # Location of Device Center ScanOrientationX= Y=
1 53 51 355"
2 51 53 65°
3 48 51 195°
Visual Device # Location of Device Center ScanOrientation
1 55 52 0°
2 48 55 125°
3 46 42 270°
4 51 50 290°
Sensor
String #
Sensor #1 I Sensor #2 Sensor #3 1
X= Y= X=- Y= X= Y=
1 93 43 91 44 89 44
2 81 59 81 61 80 62
3 74 18 74 15 73 13
4 69 37 69 40 70 42
5 55 29 56 31 57 33
6 51 40 49 39 48 38
7 37 68 39 66 40 65
8 35 17 37 18 38 20
9 14 30 14 32 15 34




LOCATION OF DETECTION DEVICES UNDER DOCTRINE 4
Radar Device # Location of Device Center ScanOrientationX= Y=
1 48 54 125°
2 50 50 260°
3 51 51 280°
Visual Device # Location of Device Center ScanOrientationX= Y=
1 51 51 350°
2 51 51 75°
3 48 54 175°





Sensor #2 Sensor #3
X= Y= X= Y= X= Y=
1 90 45 92 44 93 42
2 77 53 78 55 80 56
3 70 40 69 38 69 35
4 59 84 60 83 62 82
5 56 33 57 34 58 36
6 51 21 52 23 53 24
7 34 17 36 18 37 20
8 19 84 21 83 22 81
9 12 54 13 55 13 58




LOCATION OF DETECTION DEVICES UNDER DOCTRINE 5
Radar Device # Location of Device Center ScanOrientationX= Y=
1 52 50 320°
2 50 52 65°
3 49 51 190°
Visual Device # Location of Device Center ScanOrientationX= Y=
1 52 59 355°
2 48 55 130°
3 45 42 220°
4 51 51 310°
Sensor
String #
Sensor #1 Sensor #2 Sensor #3
.
1 65 44 66 45 66 46
2 61 52 63 52 64 53
3 66 34 67 36 68 37
4 53 46 54 47 56 49
5 54 52 55 51 56 50
6 49 56 51 55 52 54
7 48 38 49 39 51 40
8 46 49 46 51 46 52
9 43 59 43 61 42 63




LOCATION OF DETECTION DEVICES UNDER DOCTRINE 6
Radar Device # Location of Device Center ScanOrientationX= Y=
1 52 50 355°
2 49 55 60°
3 49 55 255°
Visual Device # Location of Device Center ScanOrientationX= Y=
1 51 51 310°
2 51 51 45°
3 48 55 130°
4 46 42 255°
Sensor
String #
Sensor #1 Sensor #2 Sensor #3
X= Y= X= Y= X= Y=
1 89 48 90 46 91 44
2 76 63 77 64 79 64
3 75 53 77 54 79 55
4 70 38 70 40 70 42
5 73 13 74 14 75 16
6 55 29 56 30 56 32
7 42 61 43 63 43 64
8 34 16 36 18 37 19
9 12 56 13 57 14 59






LOCATION OF DETECTION DEVICES UNDER DOCTRINE 7
Radar Device # Location of Device Center ScanOrientationX= Y=
1 53 50 270°
2 49 55 200°
3 48 56 10°
Visual Device # Location of Device Center ScanOrientationX= Y=
1 48 56 50°
2 48 56 130°
3 51 51 20°
4 46 42 315°
Sensor
String #
Sensor #1 | Sensor #2 Sensor «3
X= Y= X= Y= X= Y=
1 75 54 76 54 77 55
2 70 40 70 42 70 44
3 57 34 57 35 58 37
4 48 38 49 39 51 40
5 39 37 40 38 42 39
6 47 45 48 45 50 46
7 52 45 54 47 56 48
8 42 47 42 49 43 51
9 51 55 53 54 54 53




LOCATION OF DETECTION DEVICES UNDER DOCTRINE 8
Radar Device # Location of Device Center ScanOrientationX= Y=
1 56 52 320°
2 49 51 190°
3 48 46 55°
Visual Device # Location of Device Center ScanOrientationX= Y=
1 56 52 0°
2 51 50 300°
3 48 46 130°
4 47 42 225°
Sensor
String #
Sensor #1 Sensor #2 Sensor #2
X= Y= X= Y= X= Y=
1 89 ; 46 90 48 91 50
2 78 56 79 57 80 59
3 69 37 69 39 70 42
4 64 53 66 54 68 55
5 50 21 51 23 53 24
6 33 18 35 19 37 20
7 41 46 41 48 42 50
8 42 58 43 60 43 63
9 12 58 14 58 16 58







































COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR THE SIMULATION.











CUTE ON AN I
THE FOLLOWIN



























































































STATEMENTS PRECEDED AND FOLLOWED BY A LINE OF DOLLAR
SIGNS HAVE BEEN SHORTENED TO 60 COLUMNS FOR PUBLICATION
OF THIS DOCUMENT IN ORDER TO RUN THE PROGRAM, THESE
STATEMENTS MUST BE READJUSTED TO A 72 COLUMN FIELD.
********************************************:i{c**********
*A» ^A- iJU *^ "A* >f^ 'A' '**i' >V "J^ '''i' ^'r' '^ '^ ^A^ 'J^ 'J^ »^ "i** -^ '•*' Vi' *^ •'r '"i' "A' ^Af* 'Ar "^ '^ *'-' '^ ^^ "J^r ^^ >*»* ^Ac ^A* %V "^ ^^ ^A- ^4^ >** *^ *'' "^ '^f >"*• *'-' V^ "A* ^A* "^ *^
^p>




















































) ,0ST2(3, 2) ,aST3( 3,2)80ST4( 3, 2)
,
T7(3,2) ,0ST8(3,2) ,0ST9( 3,2) ,0ST1
IN1T4/INT1 (48,2
IN5T8/INT5(44,2
) ,INT2(42,2), INT3(45,2) ,INT4(49,
) ,INT6(43,2) , I NTT (49, 2) , I NT 8 (45,































S II AND I
ZVEG
ATA POINTS AS DESCRIBED IN CHAP-
TUDY.
CHARACTERISTIC TYPES AS DESCRIB-


















C READ IN THE NUMBER OF SQUARES TRAVERSED BY EACH GROUP.
READ(5,0003 )NNN
0003 F0RMAT(12I2)




C READ IN THE CENTER SCAN ORIENTATIONS OF THE LINE SEN-
C SORS (CHAP IV).
READ(5, 1210)SCAN
1210 F0RMAT(7F4.C)












C INITIALIZE THE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR.
NR=-9
RN=URN(NR)





C BEGIN MOVING INTRUDERS THROUGH THE BASE DEFENSE AREA,







IF(NFLAG.EQ.l) GO TO 1100
CALL SENTEC{X,Y)










IF(NFLAG.EQ.l) GO TO 1101
CALL SENTEC(X,Y)










IF(NFLAG.EQ.l) GO TO 1102
CALL SENTEC(X,Y)













IF(NFLAG.EQ.L) GO TO 1103
CALL SENTEC(X,Y)










IFCNFLAG.EQ.l) GO TO 1104
CALL SENTEC(X,Y)











IF(NFLAG.EQ,1) GO TO 1105
CALL SENTEC(XtY)










IF(NFLAG.EQ.l) GO TO 1106
CALL SENTEC(X»Y)










IF(NFLAG.EQ.l) GO TO 1107
CALL SENTEC(X,Y)










IF(NFLAG.EG.l) GO TO 1108
CALL SENTEC(X,Y)













IF(NFLAG.EQ.l ) GO TO 1109
CALL SENTEC(X,Y)










IF(NFLAG.EQ.l) GO TO 1110
CALL SENTEC(X,Y)











IF(NFLAG.EQ.l > GO TO 1111
CALL SENTEC(XtY)







C THIS SUBPROGRAM IS USED TO CHECK IF THE INTRUDER IS
C WITHIN THE SCAN SECTORt THE EFFECTIVE RANGE, AND THE
C LINE-OF-SIGHT OF ONE OF THE LINE SENSORS.
IMPLICIT INTEGER*2(Z), I NTEGER*4 ( , X
,
Y )
CCMMON/ELEVAT/ELEV( 100 t 100)
CCMM0N/0BSERX/GBSX(7)
COMMON/ OBSERY/GeSY( 7)
COMMON/ DEGREE/ SCAN( 7)
CCMMON/IVAL/IM,IV, I »IS




IF(XC.NE.O) GO TO 0105











C THE COORD SUBROUTINE CONVERTS FROM RADIANS TO DEGREES




IF(SCANP.LE. 360.0) GO TO 0104
SCANP=SCANP-360.0












































































































































IF(XC.NE.O) GO TO 0405
IF(YC.LT.O) GO TO 0406
THETA=90.0












IF(SCANP.LE. 360.0) GO TO 0404
SCANP=SCANP-360.0
IF(THETA.GT.SCANP) GO TO 0402
GO TO 04C3
0404 IF( SCANM.GE.0.0) GO TO 0401
SCANM=SCANM+360.0
IFCTHETA.GT.SCAN'M GO TO 0403
IF(THETA.GT.SCANP) GO TO 0005
GO TO 0403
0401 IF(THETA.GT.SCANP) GO TO 0005





IF(XC.NE.O) GO TO 0505














IF(SCANP.LE. 360.0) GO TO 0504
SCANP=SCANP-360.0
IF(THETA.GT.SCANP) GO TO 0502
GO TO 0503
0504 IF( SCANM.GE.0.0) GO TO 0501
SCANM=SCANM+360.0
IF(THETA.GT.SCANM) GO TO 0503
IF(THETA.GT.SCANP) GO TO 0006
GO TO 0503
0501 IF(THETA.GT.SCANP) GO TO 0006





IF(XC.NE.O) GO TO 0605
















IF( SCANP.LE .360.0) GO TO 0604
SCANP=SCANP-360.0
IF(THETA.GT.SCANP) GO TO 0602
GO TO 0603
0604 IF( SCANM.GE.0.0) GO TO 0601
SCANM=SCANM+360.0
IF(THETA.GT.SCANM) GO TO 0603
IF(THETA.GT.SCANP) GO TO 0007
GO TO 0603
0601 IF(THETA.GT.SCANP) GO TO 0007





IF( XC.NE.O) GO TO 0705














IF(SCANP.LE. 360.0) GO TO 0704
SCANP=SCANP-360.0
IF(THETA.GT.SCANP) GO TO 0702
GO TO 0703
0704 IF(SCANM.GE.O.O) GO TO 0701
SCANM=SCANM+360.0
IF(THETA.GT.SCANM) GO TO 0703
IF(THETA.GT.SCANP) GO TO 0008
GO TO 0703
0701 IF(THETA.GT.SCANP) GO TO 0008




C DETERMINED TO BE WITHIN THE SCAN OF A DEVICE, A CHECK
C IS NOW MADE TO SEE IF THE INTRUDER IS WITHIN THE EF-
C FECTIVE RANGE OF THE DEVICE.
0020 SSXY=(FXC)=;=*2+( FYC)**2
FRC=SQRT(SSXY)
IF(FRC.LT.32.0 ) GO TO 0025
GO TO (0002,0003,0004) ,
I
0021 SSXY=(FXC)-*2+( FYC )=«=*2
FRC=SQRT(SSXY)
IF(FRC.LT.16.0) GO TO 0025
1 = 1-3
GC TO (0005,0006,0007,0008),!
C NOTE THAT VALUES OF 32.0 AND 16.0 REPRESENT RANGES OF
C 3200 AND 1600 METERS FOR RADARS AND VISUAL DEVICES.
C
C INTRUDER IS IN THE SCAN SECTOR AND WITHIN RANGE OF A
C DEVICE. A CHECK IS NOW MADE TO DETERMINE IF THE INTRUD-
C ER IS WITHIN THE L I N E-OF-S IGHT OF THE DEVICE.
C INTERVISIBILITY CHECK FOLLOWS
0025 IF(THETA.LE.45.0) GO TO 0031
IF(THETA.GT. 315.0) GO TO 0031
IF(THETA.LE. 135.0) GO TO 0032
IF(THETA.LE. 225.0) GO TO 0033
IF(THETA.LE .315.0) GO TO 0034

































































































.GT.PHI ) GO TO 0990
E
980
POSITIVE Y DIRECTION FOLLOWS
ELEV{nBSY( I
)




















.GT.PHI ) GO TO 0990
E
980
NEGATIVE X DIRECTION FOLLOWS




















.GT.PHI ) GO TO 0990
E
980
NEGATIVE Y DIRECTION FOLLOWS - CASE 4























RATIO=(VTAR -RASED/ (RVT* 100.0)
PHIV=ATAN(RATin)
IFCPHIV.GT.PHI ) GO TO 0990
0134 CONTINUE
GO TO C980
C THE TARGET IS WITHIN L I NE-OF-S IGHT . GO TO APPROPRIATE
C DETECTION SUBROUTINE,
0980 GO TO (0981,0981,0981,0982,0982,0982,0982 ) tl
0981 CALL RATECT(X,Y,FRC)
GO TO (00 02, 000 3, 04, 0005, 0006, 0007, 0008) ,
I
C982 CALL VI TECT ( X, Y , FRC
)
0990 GO T0(0002, 0003, 0004, 0005, 0006, 0007, 0008) ,
END
SUBROUTINE COORD ( F XC ,FYC , THET A
)
IMPLICIT INTEGER*2( Z) , I NTEGER*4 ( 0, X , Y
)
THETA=THETA*( 180.0/3. 1416)
IF(FXC.LT.O.O) GO TO 0101







SUBROUTINE R AT ECT ( X , Y , FRC
)
C THIS SUBROUTINE DETERMINES IF THE INTRUDER IS DETECTED
C BY THE APPROPRIATE RADAR.
IMPLICIT INTEGER*2(Z), I NTEGER*4 ( , X , Y
COMMON/ VEG I T/ZVEG( 100, 100)
COMMON/
I





C IF THE TARGET IS TOO CLOSE, IT CANNOT BE DETECTED.
IF(FRT.LT. 400.0) GO TO 1002
RPD=.90
C GET MOVEMENT VALUES FROM THE MOVEMENT SUBROUTINE.
CALL MOVE(X,Y, ZMOVE,RADVEL, I ,FRT,TIME)
C IF TARGETS RADIAL VELOCITY IS LESS THAN 1 KM/HR, IT
C CANNAT BE DETECTED.
IF(RADVEL.LT.l .0) GO TO 1000



















C IF RANDOM NUNBER-PROB OF DETECTION COMPARASION
C INDICATES A DETECTION HAS BEEN MADE, THE DETECT SUB-






SUBROUTINE VIT ECT( X , Y , FRC )
C THIS SUBROUTINE DETERMINES IF THE INTRUDER IS DETECTED
C BY THE APPROPRIATE NIGHT OBSERVATION DEVICE.
IMPLICIT INTEGER*2(Z) , I NTEGER=<^4 ( , X, Y )
COMMCN/VEGIT/ZVEG( 100, 100)
COMMON/IVAL/IM tlVi I tIS
ZQ=2
FRT=FRC*100.0
RNGTBS=( (X-51 )-*2)+( (Y-51)**2)
RNGTB={ SQRT(RNGTBS) )*100.0
VPD=.90
C GET MOVEMENT VALUES FROM THE MOVEMENT SUBROUTINE.
CALL M0VE(X,Y,ZMCVE,RADVEL,l7FRTtTIME)
IF(FRT.LE. 400.0) GO TO 0010
C REDUCE THE PPOB OF DETECTION FOR RANGE IF NECESSARY.
VPD=VPD*(400.0/FRT)
0010 CONTINUE
C REDUCE PROB OF DETECTION FOR VEGETATION IF NECESSARY.










IF(RN.GT.VPD) GO TO 0012
C IF RANDOM NUMBER-PRGB OF DETECTION COMPARASION
C INDICATES A DETECTION HAS BEEN MADE, THE DETECT SUB-






SUBROUTINE MOVE ( X , Y , ZMOVE , RADVEL » I»FRT,TIME)
C THE MOVEMENT SUBROUTINE FURNISHES INTRUDER MOVEMENT
C VALUES REQUIRED BY THE RADAR AND VISUAL DETECTION
C SUBROUTINES. THE PARAMETERS ARE THE RADIAL VELOCITY OF
C THE TARGET WITH RESPECT TO THE DETECTING DEVICE AND THE
C TIME THE TARGET IS AVAILABLE FOR DETECTION.




COMMON/ I N1T4/ 1 NT 1(48, 2) ,INT2(42,2) , INT3(45,2) ,INT4(49,
12)
CCMM0N/IN5T8/INT5(44,2) , INT6(43,2) ,INT7(49,2) , I NTS (45,
12)
CCMM0N/IN9T12/INT9(50,2) , INT 10( 49, 2 )
,










IF( IM.LE.l ) GO TO 1000
INM=IM-1
C $$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$i$$J-. $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$








































C CCMPUTE DISTANCE TRAVELED
DISS=( ( X-XX)**2)+( (Y-YY)**2)
DIS=(SORT(DISS) )*100.0




IF(DIFHT.GE.O.O) GO TO 0014
DIFHT=DIFHT*(-1.0)
C REDUCE THE BASIC VELOCITY OF THE INTRUDER IN ACCORDANCE






C A BASIC VELOCITY OF 3 KM/HR IS ASSUMED.
BASVEL=3.0
VEL=BASVEL-GRED
C REDUCE THE BASIC VELOCITY OF THE INTRUDER IN ACCORDANCE









C CCMPUTE THE TIME REQUIRED FOR THIS MOVE.
TIME=( ( DIS/1000.0)/VEL)*60.0
C NOW FIGURE RADIAL VELOCITY









C THE SENSOR DETECTION SUBROUTINE DETERMINES EACH MOVE









C TO SAVE TIME, A FIRST ROUGH CHECK IS MADE TO SEE IF THE
C INTRUDER IS WITHIN 400 METERS IN BOTH THE X&Y DIRECTION
C OF THE CENTER SENSOR OF EACH SENSOR STRING.
XDIF=X-0ST1(2, 1)
XDIF=IABS(XDIF )
IF(XDIF.GT.4) GO TO 0002
YDIF=Y-0ST1 (2t2)
YDIF=IABS( YDIF )
IF(YDIF.GT.4) go to 0002
GO TO 0011
0002 XDIF=X-0ST2 (2, 1)
XDIF=IABS(XDIF)
IF(XDIF.GT.4) GO TO 0003
YDIF=Y-OST2(2, 2)
YDIF=IABS(YCIF)





IF(XDIF.GT.4) GO TO 0004
yDIF=Y-OST3(2t2)
YDIF=IABS( YDIF)




IF{XDIF.GT.4) GO TO 0005
YDIF=Y-0ST4(2,2)
YDIF=IABS( YDIF)




IF(XDIF.GT.4) GO TO 0006
YDIF=Y-0ST5(2t2)
YDIF=IABS(YDIF)




IF(XDIF.GT.4) GO TO 0007
YDIF =Y-0ST6(2, 2)
YDIF=IABS(YDIF)
































































































































WITHIN THE REQUIRED 400 METERS, THE








































































































C NOW A CHECK
C THE SAME GRI
C ASIGN BETWEE










































MADE TO DETERMINE IF THE TARGET IS IN
QUARE AS A SENSOR. IF IT IS, CQMPAR-
RANOCM NUMBER AND THE PROB OF DETECTION







4526) GO TO 9994
ON OCCURS, THE DETECT SUBROUTINE IS
(X,Y,ZQ)
*$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$*$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$





C THIS SUBROUTINE A
C "DECISION RULE TO
C THE RULE IS SATIS
C FORMAL DETECTION


























C NOTIFY THE MAIN
0006 NFLAG=1






PPLIES THE '2 DETECTION, 500 METER*
THE DETECTIONS ACQUIRED. WHEN, AND IF,
FIED FOR A PARTICULAR INTRUDER, A










CTION OF THE DECISION RULE.
ET(N,1)
) GO TO 0006
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A mathematical model describing the detection activities
of an integrated sensor array containing radars, visual
devices and remote sensors is presented. Using the pro-
grammed model, infiltration of a base defense area is simu-
lated with a computer and results are obtained for various
array deployment schemes. A comparative analysis of these
results is conducted using game and decision theory and a
general conclusion concerning an optimal sensor deployment
doctrine is derived. The complete computer program is
described in the text of the study and is contained as an
appendix.
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